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Book 



COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT 



Abstract FEDERALIST. 



A. N 



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ABSTRAC1 



OF 



)awson'sFoederalist 



BY 



WM. A. FALCONER. 






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Copyrighted by 

Anderson Bros., University of Virginia. 

1895. 






h <<z> 



Ppoui, 

The Printer, 

ehaplotteeville, 

Virginia. 



r^F^K^ 4CE, 



An inherent modesty and a becoming regard for the truth force 
me into the confession that this "Abstract" did not wholly origi- 
nate in a spirit of philanthropy ; nor was it altogether conceived in 
a selfish desire for riches and renown ; but it was rather the result 
of a condition (not a theory) over which the averageUniversity 
student has no control; of a well-defined conviction that without 
the summary adoption of heroic measures my longing and thirst- 
ing after a certificate oni Constitutional Law would prove but an 
empty "an irridescent dream. The ghost of many a good man 
who had made "everything except Foederalist" in his mad strug- 
gle after a " B. L." rose up to admonish me that something must 
be done and that quickly ; that something took definite form in 
the plan here adopted. Hence, you will see, that my" Abstract" 
was begun in a spirit of self-preservation ; and it was not until 
some 400 pages of Foederalist had been generously interspersed 
with "wherein consider's" that desire for pelf and the world's 
applause gained the mastery. And now if the students will be as 
charitable as I have been frank, and regard this effort with some 
degree of favor, then will I account myself thrice happy. 

William Armistead Falconer. 
Ft. Smith, Ark., June 6, '94. 



FOEDERALIST. 



PRELIMINARY. 



The War of the Revolution was at its height, when in 1776, 
the American colonies feeling the necessity of unity and system 
in their struggle against Great Britain, called a Convention to 
meet at Philadelphia to organize a general Government. On the 
4th of July this Convention reported the Declaration of Indepen- 
dence and eight days after adopted the "Articles of Confedera- 
tion," whose many glaring defects are so strongly portrayed in 
the"Foederalist." 

Under this loose-jointed form of Government, the colonies fought 
out the Revolution ; but after a six years' trial of this Govern- 
ment, during profound peace, with no authority at home and no 
influence abroad, its insufficiency was too apparent. It was in 
this state of affairs that eleven of the thirteen States responded 
to a call to meet at Philadelphia in May, 1787, to try and patch 
up the tottering Governmental fabric. 

The delegates that met in compliance with this call composed 
one of the ablest and most patriotic bodies that ever assembled 
in any country: Washington, Peyton Randolph and Madison, 
from Virginia; Luther Martin, of Maryland; Benjamin Franklin 
and Robert Morris, of Pennsylvania ; Charles Pinckney, of South 
Carolina, and Alexander Hamilton, of New York, were the tran- 
scendent spirits of the Convention. During the four long, exciting 
and trying months of that Convention, the calm dignity and 
firmness and the calm confidence of Washington, which never 
abated; and the wisdom, philanthropy and good nature of Ben- 
jamin Franklin, ever ready with a joke or a compromise, made 
the Constitution possible. When it came to adjusting the con- 
flicting claims of the larger and smaller States and men like 
Luther Martin had left the Convention in disgust, despairing of 
a satisfactory accommodation, these two men, more than any 
others, brought that eventful session to a successful termination. 



FOEDERALIST. O 

Three general plans of Government were proposed : one each by 
Hamilton, Randolph and Charles Pinckney. It was the desire of 
Hamilton and Randolph, whose plans were in the main quite 
similar, to do away with all Federal features in the Constitution 
and establish one strong, central and National Government. 
Both of these plans were rejected, and Hamilton's, which 
smacked somewhat more of a limited monarchy, was so espe- 
cially distasteful and was so summarily rejected that he thought 
it best to refrain from any further expressions till near the close 
of the session, when he gave his hearty support to the Constitu- 
tion as adopted, which embodied the principal features of the 
Pinckney plan. Although a silent member and but 26 years of 
age, Hamilton took high rank among the great men in that great 
body. He was a member of the "Committee on Style," which 
gave to the Constitution its present arrangement and splendid 
style. But, for learning, exhaustive reasoning and conscientious 
statesmanship, probably no one in that body was Madison's 
equal. 

As soon as the Constitution had been adopted by the Conven- 
tion, in September, 1787, and it had been sent to the various 
States to be ratified, before going into effect, it was received with 
the most bitter opposition. In New York, under the leadership 
of George Clinton, and probably, Aaron Burr, this feeling was 
intense; while in Virginia, the eloquent invective of Patrick 
Henry made the more enlightened friends of liberty tremble for 
the outcome. It was this condition of affairs in their own States 
that inspired Hamilton and Madison to give to the people through 
weekly and semi- weekly newspaper articles that splendid work of 
genius, the "Foederalist," which as an authoritative, contempo- 
raneous treatise on the Constitution has no equal. Before the 
profound learning and irresistible logic of these two men, assisted 
in four or five articles by John Jay, all material opposition melted 
away and the Constitution was adopted. So highly did Mr. Jef- 
ferson appreciate the "Foederalist," that he selected it as the 
text book of the University of Virginia on Constitutional Law 
and as such it remains, and as such, I trust, will remain. 

W. A. F. 



FOEDERALIST. 



(1). General Introduction. (2). Argument in Favor of 
Adoption of the Constitution. (3). Conclusion. 

Part I. Introduction— w. c. 

(1). Importance of the Subject: (Consideration of the 
Constitution). (2). Obstacles to a Fair Consideration of 
the Constitution. (3). Necessity For a Fair Consideration. 
l a . Importance of the Subject. 
l b . It involves the existence of the Union, etc. 
2\ The safety and welfare of the States involved. 
3 b . It will " decide whether societies of men are capable 
of establishing good Government from reflection and 
choice." 
2 a . Obstacles to a Fair Consideration of Constitution. 
1\ "The obvious interest of a certain class of men in 
every State to resist all changes that may diminish 
their power." 

2 b . "The perverted ambition of another class of men 
who will either hope to aggrandize themselves by the 
confusions of their country or flatter themselves with 
fairer prospects of elevation from a division into sev- 
eral Confederacies than under one Government." 
3 b . Because the Constitution affects so many particular 
interests. 

4\ Because it innovates upon too many local institu- 
tions. 
3 a . Necessity of a fair consideration of the Constitution. 
l b . To prevent the obscuring of the main question by 
a torrent of passions. 
3 b . To guard against all attemps to influence a decision 



in a matter of so great importance by any impressions 
except those which result from the evidence of truth. 

Part II. Argument in Favor of the Adoption of the 
Constitution— w. c. 

(1). Theutility of Union to political prosperity. (2). The 
insufficiency of the present Confederation to preserve the 
Union. (3). Thenecessity of a Government at least equally 
energetic with that of Constitution to preserve the Union. 
(4 ) . The conformity of Constitution to the true principles of 
Republican Government. (5). Its analogy to the New York 
Constitution. (6). The additional security which its adop- 
tion will afford to Republican Government, to liberty and 
to property, w. c. 
l a . The Utility of Union to Political Prosperity. 

(1). Introduction. (2). Argument. 
l b . Introduction — w. c. 

V. Necessity to prove the utility of Union. (2). A 
general view of the utility of Union. 
l d . Because it is already being intimated that the 
thirteen States are of too great extent for any gen- 
eral system and that we must resort to distinct and 
separate Confederacies. 
2 d . This doctrine may be gradually propagated. 
3 d . The reasons for adopting a Union argue for a pres- 
ervation of that Union now. 
2 C . A general view of the utility of the Union. 

(1). A doctrine until lately unquestioned. (2). The 
natural and physical inducements to Union. (3). Our 
past history shows the appreciation of the people of 
the utility of Union. 
l d . A doctrine till now unquestioned. 
2 d . The natural inducements to Union. 
l e . The character of the country (soil, rivers, etc.) 
2 e . The character of the people. 
3\ The association of the people as one nation dur- 
ing a long and bloody war. 
3 d . Our past history shows appreciation, etc. 



dawson's foederaust. 



10 dawson's foederaljst. 

(1). From the adoption at an early date of the Arti- 
cles of Confederation. (2). From their convening, "as 
with one voice," the late convention at Philadelphia. 
l e . From the adoption at an early date of the Articles 
of Confederation. 
l f . Proved defective by experience. 
2 f . Causes of defects in the Articles. 
I s . Formed by men comparatively inexperienced. 
2 g . Formed during times of bloodshed and excite- 
ment. 
3 s . No sufficient opportunity for calm and mature 
reflection. 
2*. From their convening, "as with one voice," the 
late Convention of Philadelphia. 
l f . Object of that Convention. 
2 f . Character of that Convention. 
l g . Composed of wisej patriotic and tried men 

possessing confidence of the people. 
2 g . Many of the members of former Convention 

were in this Convention. 
3 g . They sat in the "mild season of peace." 
4 g . With minds unoccupied by other subjects. 
5 g . They deliberated daily for many months. 
6 g . They were unanimous in presenting the Consti- 
tution. 
2 b . Argument for the utility of the Union. 

(1). The several instances of the utility of the Union. 
(2). Reply to the objection that the extent of territory 
is too great for one general Government. 
l c . The several instances of the utility of the Union — 
w. c. 

(1). As a security against foreign arms and influence. 
(2). To prevent dissensions among the States. (3). In 
our commercial relations. (4). In establishing a navy. 
(5). As a barrier against domestic faction and insur- 
rection. (6). In respect to revenue. (7). In the greater 
economy in the administration of the Government. 
l d . As a security against foreign arms and influence. 



dawson's foederalist. 11 



12 dawson's foederalist. 

(1). In the case of just wars. (2). Unjust wars. 
l e . As a security against foreign arms and influence 
in the case of just wars. 

(1). Through a removal of the causes. (2). From 
the greater ability to settle amicably such causes. 
l f . Through a removal of the usual causes of a just 
war. 

(1). Violations of treaties. (2). Direct violence. 
I s . Removal of causes resulting from violations of 
treaties. 
1\ By securing a better administration of Gov- 

ment. (p. 13.) 
2\ By the employment of better men. 
l j . More general and extensive reputation for 
ability and integrity will be required. 
2 j . There will be a wider field for choice. 
3 h . By an uniform interpretation of treaties. 
1 J . Because of a single tribunal under the general 

Government. 
2 J . Because of singleness of interest. 
3 J . Because there will be wanting the bias of 
local interest. 
4\ By avoiding the local Temptations to bad 

Faith to which a single State may yield. 
5\ By avoiding local Prejudices of a single State. 
2 g . Direct Violence (2d cause of just war). 
l h . Experience of the past shows that several In- 
dian wars were caused by individual States and 
not one by the Federal Government. 
2\ The neighborhood of Spanish and British ter- 
ritory bordering on some States— just apprehen- 
sion for the future, (p. 15.) 
2 f . Through the greater ability it will afford to set- 
tle amicably the causes of just war. 
l g . In the absence of local Pride and Prejudice. 
2 g . In the greater strength of Union. 
2 e . Through a security against Foreign Arms and 
Influence in the case of Unjust Wars— w. c. 



dawson's foederalist. 13 



14 dawson's foederalist. 

(1). Causes of unjust wars. (2). Instances where- 
in Union would afford greater security in this re- 
spect. 

l f . Causes of Unjust Wars. 
(1). In general. (2). In case of States. 
2 s . Causes, etc., in general. 
1\ Affecting absolute Sovereigns. 
l j . Thirst for Military Glory. 
2 J . Revenge for personal affronts. 
3 j . To aggrandize their Families and Partisans. 

2\ Causes affecting Nations and particularly the 
States. 

l j . From the ambition of influential men. 
2 J . Those growing out of Situation and Circum- 
stances. 

l k . The States are rivals with France and Bri- 
tain in Fisheries. 

2 k . The States are the rivals of Spain, Britain 
and others in the Navigation and Carrying 
Trade, (p. 19). 

3 k . Their rivals in the trade to India and China. 

2 f . Instances wherein Union would afford greater 
security against Unjust Wars. (Fed. p. 19 andseq). 

l g . One general Government can avail itself of the 
ablest men in every part of the Union. 

2 g . It can move on uniform principles of policy. 

3 g . It can apply the Resources of the Whole to 
Protection of a Part. 

4 g . The Militia will be more efficient. 

5 g . It can establish a strong navy. 

2 d . The utility of the Union as a security against Dis- 
sensions among the States themselves — w. c. 

(1). The danger of hostilities arising between in- 
dependent, unconnected and neighboring sovereign- 
ties. (2), Certain objections of anti-constitutionists. 
( 3 ) . The inducements the disunited States would have 



dawson's foederaeist. 15 



16 jdawson's foederaust. 

to make war on each other. (4). The consequences 
of inter-state hostilities— w. c. 
l e . The Danger of Hostilities arising between inde- 
pendent, unconnected and neighboring Sovereignties 
l f . Through love of Power. 
2 f . Through jealousy of Power. 
3 f . Through competition of commerce. 
4 f . Through the Passions and Influences of Individ- 
uals — illustrated from history, (pp 29—30). 
l g . Pericles, to gratify the resentment of Aspasia, 

attacks and destroys the city of the Samnians. 
2 s . Pericles, (1) stimulated by private pique against 
the Megarensians or (2) to avoid prosecution 
for a supposed theft of statuary of Phidias, (3) or 
to avoid a prosecution for dissipating public 
funds, was the primitive author of the Peloponne- 
sian war. 
3 s . Cardinal Wolsey, aspiring to be Pope and to 
secure the influence of Charles V, plunged England 
into a war with France. 
4 g . Shays, being a desperate debtor, plunged Mas- 
sachusetts into a civil war. 
2 e . Certain objections of anti-Constitutionists an- 
swered. 

(1) The objections stated and (2) answered* 
l f . The objections stated. 
I s . "The genius of Republics is Pacific. " 
2 g . "The spirit of commerce tends to Peace." 
3 g . " Commercial Republics will never be disposed 

to so far forget interest as to engage in wars." 
2 f . The objections answered. 
l g . It is the interest of all nations to cultivate 

peace. 
2 g . Republics are administered by men, as Monarch- 
ies, and are subject to rage, jealousy, etc. 
3 g . History appealed to. 
1\ Republics have been warlike. 
1\ Sparta. 



dawson's foederalist. 17 



18 



2\ Athens. 
3\ Rome. 
4 k . Carthage. 
5 k . Venice. 
6 k . Holland. 
2 h . Commercial Republics have been warlike. 
l k . Athens. 
2\ Carthage. 
3\ Venice. 
4 k . Holland. 
> e . The inducements which the disunited States would 
have to make war on each other, (p. 34). 
(1). General causes. (2). Particular causes. 
l f . General Causes. 

The same that have produced wars elsewhere. 
2 f . Particular Causes — w. c. 

(1). Unadjusted territorial disputes. (2). Com- 
mercial rivalry. (3). The existing debts of the Con- 
federacy. (4). Local laws violative of private con- 
tracts. (5). Alliances between individual States and 
foreign powers. 
l g . Unadjusted Territorial Disputes — w. c. 

(1). Thenatureof such disputes. (2). Arguments 
of the disputants. (3). Example of past territorial 
disputes. 
l h . The Nature of such Disputes — w. c. 

(1). They will arise out of the " Crown Lands." 
(2). The Western lands, etc. (3). In regard to appor- 
tionment. 

l k . Those arising out of claims to Crown Lands. 
2 k . Those arising out of claims to Western ter- 
ritory. 
2\ Arguments of the disputing States. 
1\ Those claiming Crown Lands. 

(1) "They are ours because they were in the 
limits of our State under the colonial Govern- 
ment." 

(2) "No, they are the proportionate prop- 



dawson's foederalist. 19 



20 dawson's foederalist. 

property of all because the rights of the Crown 

devolved on the Union." 

2 k . Those claiming Western lands (which arebj 

cession or anterior right the property of the 

Union). 

(1) The ceding States: "They are ours by 
reversion." 

(2) The others: "No, we are all entitled to 
a proportionate share, for a grant once made 
can never be revoked" 

3 k . In regard to apportionment. 

If, contrary to probability, all the States 
should admit that each was entitled to a share 
of these lands, then trouble would result as to 
proper rule of apportionment. 
3\ Examples of past territorial disputes. 
l k . Dispute between Connecticut and Pennsyl- 
vania over Wyoming lands. 
2 k . Dispute between New York and Vermont. 
2 s . Commercial Rivalry. 

(1) Causes. (2) Illustrated by New York, Con- 
necticut and New Jersey. 
l h . Causes. 

l j . Jealousy of States whose locality is not favor- 
able to commerce, (p. 37.) 
2 J . From the different systems of commercial 

polity. 
2\ Illustrated by New York, Connecticut and New 
Jersey. 

New York from her situation and for revenue lays 
duties on imports ; New Jersey and Connecticut 
become jealous. 

3 s . The existing debt of the Confederacy. 
1\ The Difficulties of a proper Apportionment. 
2 h . The Difficulties of a proper Extinguishment. 
4 g . Local Laws violative of Private Contracts. 

E. g. The enormities of the Legislature of Rhode 
Island and retaliation of Connecticut. 
5 s . Incompatible Alliances. 



dawson's foederalist. 21 



22 



4 e . The Consequences of inter-state Hostilities. 

(1). The primary, and (2). The ultimate conse- 
sequences. 

l f . The primary consequences of inter-state Hostili- 
ties : Sudden conquests, rapid desolation. 

2 f . The ultimate consequences of inter-state Hostil- 
ities. 

l g . Standing Armies. 
2 g . A strong executive — Monarchy. 
3 g . The elevation of the Military over the Civil 
Power. 

(p. 47). 
3 d . The utility of Union as a Barrier to domestic Fac- 
tion, etc. 

(1), The nature of a faction. (2). Liability of Re- 
publics to tactions. (3). Advantages of a Confederacy 
in cases of Factions. (4). Modes of curing mischiefs 
of factions — w. c. 
l e . The Nature of Factions, (p. 56). 

"A Faction is a number of citizens, whether 
amounting- to a majority or minority of the whole, 
who are actuated by some common impulse of pas- 
sion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other 
citizens or the permanent and aggregate interests of 
the community." 
2 e . Liability of Republics to Faction. 

(1). Illustrated from history. (2). This tendency 
furnishes arguments for advocates of despotism. 
l f . Illustrated from History. 
l g . The Grecian Republic. 
2 g . The Italian Republic. 
2 f . This Tendency An Argument for Advocates of 

Despotism. 
3 e . The advantages of a Confederacy in cases of Fac- 
tion — w. c. 

(1). Montesquieu's Views. (2). Nature of a Con- 
federacy. 
l f . Montesquieu's Views. 



dawson's foederalist. 23 



24 dawson's foederalist. 

1) As represented by opponents of the Constitu- 
tion, and (2) as they are. 
l g . Montesquieu's views as represented: 

That he argues against an extended territory for 
a Republican Government and a general union of 
States. The standards he had in view were smaller 
than most of the States. 

Consequences of an adoption of this view. 

(1) Either a division of each of these States, or (2) 
Taking refuge in the arms of monarchy. 
2 s . Montesquieu's views as they are. 

He explicitly treats of a Confederate Republic as 
expedient for extending the sphere of popular gov- 
ernment and reconciling the advantages of Mon- 
archy with those of Republicanism. He defines a 
Confederate Republic to be * 'a convention by which 
"several smaller States agree to become members of 
"a larger one which they intend to form. It is a 
"kind of assemblage of societies, that constitute a 
"new one, capable of increasing by new associa- 
tions, till they arrive to such a degree of power as 
"to be able to provide for the security of the united 
"body." 
2 f . Nature of a Confederacy. 

(1) Distinction between a Confederacy and a Con- 
solidation of the States. (2) Confederate Republic 
defined. (3) Nature of Lycian Confederacy— w. c. 
l g . Distinction between a Confederacy and a Con- 
solidation of the States, (p. 53.) 

A distinction between the two, more subtle than 
accurate, has been drawn. 

The essentials of the first are said to be 

(1) The restriction of its authority to the mem- 
bers in their corporate capacity ; 

(2) No concern in internal matters; 

(3) An exact equality of suffrage. 
These positions in reality are 

(1) Arbitrary; 

(2) Unsupported by principal or precedent. ; 

(3) The principles contended for are the cause of 
disorder and imbecility in Government. 



dawson's foederalist. 25 



26 dawson's foederalist. 

2 g . The Confederate Republic defined. 

An assemblage of societies or an assemblage of 
two or more States into one State. It will exist 
as long as (1) the members have separate organ- 
izations, and (2) exist by constitutional necessity 
for local purposes. 

3 g . Nature of the Lycian Confederacy. 

(1) It consisted of twenty-three cities or Repub- 
lics : the largest had each three votes in the common 
council, the next had two and thesmallest one; (2) 
the common council appointed all the judges and 
magistrates of cities. 

1\ Montesquieu takes this as a " model of an ex- 
cellent Confederate Republic." 
2 h . Yet its members had unequal suffrage 
3 h . And did not regulate their internal affairs (ap- 
pointing judges, etc). - 

4 e . Modes of Curing the Mischiefs of Faction. 

(1) By removing its cause. (2) By controlling its 
effects — w. c. 

l f . By removing its cause. 

(1). By destroying the liberty of the people. (2). 
By causing every citizen to possess the same opinions. 

l g . By destroying liberty of the people. 
Unwise. 

2 g . By causing every citizen to have the same pas- 
sion, interests and opinions. 
Impracticable. 

2 f . By controlling its effects. 

(1) The necessity of faction. (2) The modes of 
controlling effects of faction. 
l g . The Necessity of Faction. (Foed., pp. 57-8-9.) 
Faction must, to some extent, exist in every free 
government. 

2 s . The modes of controlling the effects. 
(1) When a minority. (2) When a majority. 

l h . When a minority. 
By regular vote. 



dawson's foederalist. 25 



28 dawson's foederalist. 

2 h When a majority. 

(1) By preventing the existence of the same pas- 
sions or interests in the majority at the same 
time — or (2) they must be rendered unable to con- 
cert by their number and local situation. 
l j . By preventing the existence of the same pas- 
sions or interests in the majority. 

2 j . The majority must be rendered unable to con- 
cert by their number and local situation. 
(1) The utility of a Democracy in accomplish- 
ing this object. (2). The utility of a Republic. 
l k . The utility of a Democracy, etc. 

A Democracy, which is a society consisting of 
a small number of citizens, who assemble and 
administer the government in person, can admit 
of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. 

2\ Utility of a Republic, etc. 

(1). Nature of a Republic. (2). Differences be- 
tween a Republic and a Democracy. (3). Advan- 
tage of a large over a small Republic in curing 
faction. 
I 1 . Nature of a Republic. 

A government in which the scheme of repre- 
sentation takes place. 

2 1 . Differences between a Republic and a Democ- 
racy. 

(1). The delegation of the Government in 
a Republic to a small number of citizens elected 
by the rest. (2). The greater number of citi- 
zens and the greater sphere of country over 
which it extends — w. c. 

l m . The Delegation of the Government in a 

Republic to a small number of citizens elected 

by the rest. (p. 61). 

(1). Effect of this difference. (2). A large 
Republic will be most favorable to election of 
proper guardians of the public weal. 

l n . Effect of the Delegation of Government, 
etc. 



29 



30 dawson's foederalist. 

1°. To refine and enlarge the public views by 
passing them through the medium of a 
chosen body of citizens. 

2°. Or contra, men of factious tempers and 
sinister designs may, by intrigue or cor- 
ruption, obtain the suffrages and betray the 
interests of the people. 

2 n . Large Republics will be most favorable to 
election of proper Guardians of Public 
Weal. 

1°. From Greater Probability of a Fit 

Choice. However small the Republic, the 

Representatives must be raised to a certain 

number to guard against the cabals of a 

few; and however large it may be they 

must be limited to a certain number to 

guard against the confusion of a multitude. 

Hence the ratio of Representatives to the 

people being less in a large Republic there 

will be greater option. 

2°. From the greater difficulty of unworthy 

candidates practicing successfully their 

vicious arts, each Representative being 

chosen by a larger number. 

2 m . The greater number of cities and greater 

sphere of country over which a large Republic 

may extend. 

l n . The smaller the society the fewer distinct 

parties and interests. 
2 a . The fewer distinct parties and interests 
the more frequently will the same party have 
a majority. 
3 n . The smaller the number of persons in 

majority the smaller their compass. 
4 n . Smaller their compass the greater ease of 
concert and execution of plans. 
3 1 . Advantage of a large over a small Republic 
in curing the mischiefs of factions. 
The same a Republic has over a Democracy. 



dawson's foederalist. 31 



32 dawson's foederalist. 

4 d . Utility of the Union in our commercial relations 
with foreign States and among the States. 

(1). Utility of the Union in our commercial rela- 
tions with foreign States. (2). Among the States. 
l e . Utility of the Union in our commercial relations 
with foreign States — w. c. 

(1) Advantages of union, and (2) disadvantages 
of disunion. 
l f . Advantages of Union in this respect. 

(1). In regard to commercial treaties. (2). In 
securing the benefits arising from our own markets. 
(3). In establishing a federal navy. 
2 f . Disadvantages of Disunion in this respect. 

(1). The rivalship of the different States would 
frustrate all natural advantages of commerce. (2). 
It would become the prey of nations at war with 
each other. (3). It would' invite foreign nations to 
interfere with commercial rights acquired under the 
Union, (a) in the fisheries; (b) in the navigation of 
the lakes, and (c) of the Mississippi river. 
2 e . Utility of the Union in Commercial Relations 
among the States. 

Commercial enterprise will have much greater 
scope from the diversity in the productions of differ- 
ent States. Variety as well as value of products for 
exportation contributes to the activity of foreign 
commerce. 
5 d . Utility of the Union in establishing a Navy. 

The Union could command the resources of all the 
States ; the sailors of the Northern States ; tar, pitch 
and turpentine and wood from the South ; iron from 
the Southern and Middle States, (p. 73-79). 
6 d . Utility of the Union in respect of Revenue. 

(1). Necessity for revenue. (2). How raised (i. e., 
principally by indirect taxation). 
l e . Necessity for Revenue, (p. 79). 

A nation cannot long exist without it. 
2 e . Methods of Raising Revenue. 

1). By direct taxation. (2). By indirect taxation. 



DAWSON'S FOEDERAUST. 33 



34 DAWSON 'S FOEDERALIST. 

l f . By Direct Taxation. 

This method not desirable. (1). Experience of this 
method. (2). Its disadvantages. 
l g . Experience of raising Revenue by Direct Taxa- 
tion. 

(1). In America. (2). In Great Britain. 
2 g . Its Disadvantages. 
(1). In case of personal and (2) of real property. 
l h . In case of Personal Property. 

Too precarious and invisible to be so reached. 
2\ In case of Real Property. 

They will reluctantly yield scanty supplies. 
2 f . Raising Revenue by Indirect Taxation. 
1 g . This the only Feasible Mode. 

Follows from the disadvantages of the direct 
tax. 

2 g . Advantages of a Union in Raising Revenue by 
Indirect Taxation. 

(1). By increasing commerce. (2). By preventing 
smuggling. 
l h . By Increasing Commerce. 
l j . As commerce flourishes lands advance in 

value. 
2 j . Increases the value of products by giving a 
freer vent to trade. 

3 j . It contributes to the quantity of money and 
to its rapidity of circulation. 
2\ By preventing smuggling. 

(1). Opportunities for. (2). Consequences. 
l j . Opportunities for smuggling. 
l k . In case of the Union. 

There will be only one side — the Atlantic coast 
— to guard, and the Government would have the 
same interest to provide against smuggling 
everywhere, and would have a strong navy to 
prevent it. 

2 k . In case of Disunion. 
I 1 . From the relative situation of the States. 



dawson's foederalist. 35 



36 dawson's foederalist. 

2 1 . From the affinity of language and manners. 

3 1 . From the familiar habits of intercourse. 

4\ Mutual jealousy would make duties low in 
order to discourage smuggling and thus de- 
stroy revenue. 

5 1 . An army of patrols would be necessary on 
every border line. 

2 J . Consequences of smuggling. 

Attempts to prevent it would cause greater ex- 
pense from the greater necessity of patrols, while 
smuggling lessens the Government revenues. 

7 d . Utility of the Union in the greater economy in the 
administration of the Government. 

l e . There will be but one civil national list to sup- 
port. 
2 e . There will be no necessity of internal patrols for 

collecting revenue. 
3 e . Large military establishments prevented. 
2 C . Reply to Objection that the Extent of Territory is 
Too Great for one General Government. 
(1). Extent of territory required in a Democracy and 
Republic respectively. (2). Conformity of the United 
States to this standard. (3). Certain considerations in 
advocacy of present extent of territory. 
l d . The Extent of Territory Required in a Democracy 
and Republic. 
l e . In a Democracy. 

(a) Of such extent that the most remote citizens 
may conveniently assemble for transaction of public 
affairs, and (b) will include no greater number than 
can join in those affairs. 
2 e . In a Republic. 

Of such extent that the representatives may meet 
at the Capital as often as may be necessary for ad- 
ministration of public affairs. 

2 d . Conformity of United States to this Requirement. 
(1). Its exact extent. (2). As compared to Great 
Britain. 



dawson's eoederalist. 37 



38 



1*. Its exact extent. 
l f . From East to West. 

From the Atlantic to the Mississippi, about 750 
miles. 
2 f . From North to South. 

(a). Between 31° and45°=14° 

(b). Between 31° and 42° -=11° 



Average about 12^°=about 868 miles. 
2 e . Conformity of United States, etc., as compared 
with Great Britain, etc. 

l f . As compared with Germany, very little larger. 
2 f . As compared with Poland, very little larger. 
3 f . As compared with Great Britain. Representatives 
from North Scotland have as far to travel to Par- 
liament as Representatives would in this country. 
3 d . Certain Considerations in Advocacy of the pres- 
ent extent of the Union. 
l e . The general Government's Jurisdiction is re- 
stricted to certain general and enumerated objects. 
2 e . To secure the Union of the Thirteen States and 

to form new ones. 
3°. Intercourse throughout the Union will be daily 

facilitated by roads, canals, etc. 
4 C . Almost every State will have a frontier to guard 
and thus would find it expedient to sacrifice any 
supposed inconvenience from the extent of territory 
to their own safety. 
2 a . The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to 
Preserve the Union. 
l b . Its Insufficiency Not Controverted. 
2 b . Consequences of its Insufficiency — (p. 93). 
3 b . Necessity for Proof of' Its Insufficiency. 

While it is admitted that the present Government is 
destitute of energy, the powers requisite for supplying 
that energy are denied. 
4 b . The Several Defects of the Confederation. 

(1). The legislation for States in their corporate 



39 



40 dawson's foederalist. 

capacity. (2). The total want of a sanction to its 
laws. (3). The want of a mutual guaranty of the State 
Governments. (4). Regulating contributions of the 
States by quotas. (5). Want of a power to regulate com- 
merce. (6). Raising troops by quotas. (7). Equal suf- 
frage among the States in Congress. (8). The want of a 
judiciary power. (9). The organization of Congress 
utterly improper for exercising the powers necessary to a 
Federal Union. (10). The Confederation was never rati- 
fied by the people — w. c. (p. 90.) 

l e . First Defect. Legislation for States in their corpor- 
ate capacity. 
(1). Consequences of this and other defects. (2). The 

nature of Government and the necessity for it. (3). 

The modes of enforcing Government — w. c. 

l d . Consequences of This and Other Defects. 
l e . Consequences of This, Defect in Particular. 

Though the Congressional resolutions are in 
theory constitutionally binding and they may make 
indefinite requisitions for men or money, in practice 
they are mere recommendations which the States 
observe or disregard at pleasure. 
2 e . Consequences of This and Other Defects in Gen- 
eral. 
l f . Inability to pay foreign debts contracted in a 

time of imminent peril. 
2 f . Possession of important posts by foreign powers. 
3 f . We have no troops, treasury or Government. 
4 f . Exclusion from Navigation of Mississippi river. 
5 f . No Public Credit, (p. 92). 
6 f . No Public Commerce, (p. 92). 
7 f . Violent Decrease in Value of Lands. 
8 f . Want of Private Credit and Confidence, (p. 92). 
2 d . The Nature of Government and the Necessity 
for it. 

l e . The Nature of Government. 
1*. Government implies the power of making- 
laws. 



dawson's foederaust. 41 



42 dawson's foederalist. 

2 f . A Law implies a Sanction. 
2 e . The Necessity for Government. 

Because the passions of men will not conform to 
the dictates of reason and justice without constraint. 
States are less influenced by these dictates of reason 
and justice because: 

(1) Regard to reputation has less influence when 
the infamy of a bad action is to be divided among a 
number 

(2) A spirit of faction will often hurry bodies of 
men into excesses of which, in a private capacity, 
they would not be guilty. 

3 d . The Modes of Enforcing Government. 

(1) Through a coercion of arms. (2). Through coer- 
cion of the magistracy. 
l c . Through a Coercion of Arms. (p. 101). 
(1). Results of the employment of this mode. 
(2). Its impracticability. 
l e . Results of the Employment of this Mode. 
l g . Constant Inter-State Wars. 
2 s . Foreign Alliances. 
3 g . Death of the Confederacy. 
4 s . A Military Despotism. 
2 f . The Impracticability. 
l g . It is not probable, considering the genius of the 
country, that the complying States would be often 
inclined to support the Union in a war against 
the non-complying States. 
2 g . There would be great difficulty in determining 
when force could be used with propriety — it would 
often be impossible to determine whether delin- 
quency proceeded from inability or disinclination. 
3 s . The resources of the Union would be insufficient 
to sustain an army large enough to keep the larger 
States within the limits of their duty. 
2 e . Through Coercion of the Magistracy. 

(1). Advantages of this method. (2). Objections 
answered. 
l f . Advantages of this Method. 



dawson's foederalist. 



43 



44 dawson's foederalist. 

It results from the observations under (l 9 ) that 
the enforcement of laws by coercion of arms would 
be disastrous if not impracticable, and hence it is 
only through the magistracy that the laws can be en- 
forced — by extending the authority of the Govern- 
ment to individuals and not restricting it to States. 

2 f . Objections to the Government's Employing the 
Coercion of the Magistracy answered. 

I s . "That any disaffected State could at any Time 
Obstruct the Execution of the Laws in this 
Method as in the other." 

1\ When the Government acts on States and not 
on individuals and the consent of a State Legis- 
lature is necessary to carry out the Government's 
plans, mere non-compliance, inaction or evasion 
will defeat those plans. 

2\ When the Government acts on individuals no 
evasions or omissions would answer. To resist 
the Government in this case they must act posi- 
tively. The success of such resistance would de- 
pend on the concurrence of a majority of the 
Legislature, on the Courts of Justice and on the 
People, (p. 105). 

2 g . "That individuals, more or less numerous, may 
still obstruct the Government." 

1. As to those partial commotions which do 
not affect the great body of the community, the 
general Government would possess greater re- 
sources to suppress them than any single State. 

2. As to those mortal feuds which spread confla- 
gration through a whole nation, they do not fall 
within any ordinary rules of calculation. No form 
of Government can always either avoid or control 
them. 

3 g . " That the Reserved Rights of the States would 
be invaded by the General Government." 
1\ No Competent Inducement. 

The ambitious officers of the Go vernment would 
find ample fields for exercise of their ambition in 



dawson's fobdbralist. 45 



46 dawson's foederai.ist. 

commerce, war, negotiation and Bnance, which 
are all given to the Government. 

2\ The People through the House of Representa- 
tives could prevent it. 

3\ There is greater danger that the delegated 
authority of the General Government will be in- 
vaded by State Governments. 

1 J . The State Governments will possess a greater 
degree of influence over the people. 

l k . On account of that diffusive and general con- 
struction and General Government. 
2\ From the nature of the objects to which the 
State Governments would be directed. 
E. g., In the ordinary administration of civil 
and criminal justice. 
2 j . Illustrated from History. 

(1). Illustrated by Feudal System. (2). The 
Clans of Scotland. (3). The Amphictyonic League. 
(4). The Achaean League. (5). The Germanic 
League. (6). The History of Poland. (7). Switz- 
erland. (8). United Netherlands. 
1\ Tendency of States to despoil the General 
Government, illustrated from the History of 
the Feudal System. 
(1). Their similarity to Confederacies. (2). 

The result of this svstem. 

- 

I 1 . Their Similarity to Confederacies. 

There were a common head and subordinate 
barons, who were sovereign in their respective 
territories. 
2 1 . The Result of this System. 

Continual opposition to the sovereign and 
frequent wars between the barons. 
2\ Illustrated by the History of the Clans of 
Scotland. 

The spirit of clanship uniting the nobles and 
their dependants made the aristocracy a con- 
stant overmatch for the monarch, until the in- 



47 



48 dawson's foederalist. 

corporation with England under a more ener- 
getic Government. 

3\ Illustrated by the History of the Amphicty- 
onic League. 

(1). Its similarity to the American Confedera- 
tion. (2). Result. 

I 1 . Its Similarity to the American Confedera- 
tion under the Articles of Confederation. 

l m . The several States were sovereign and had 
an equal vote in the Common Council. 

2 m . The Council had authority to declare war. 

3 m . To fine members. 

4 m . To admit new members. 

5 m . To decide in the last resort all controver- 
sies between the States. 
2 1 . Result of this form of Government. 

l m . The more powerful members tyrannized 
over the rest. 
E. g., Athens was arbiter of Greece 73 

years; Lacedaemonia -was arbiter of Greece 

29 years ; Thebes next held sway. 

2 m . In wars with Persia and Macedon the 
members never acted in concert. 

3 m . When not at war with foreigners internal 
dissensions ensued. 

E. g., The Phocians ploughed up some con- 
secrated ground belonging to the temple of 
Apollo. The Amphictyonic Council imposed a 
fine. The Phocians at instigation of Athens 
and Sparta refused to submit. Thebes and 
others tried to enforce it and invited Philip of 
Macedon. He bribed his way into the league 
and became its master. 
4\ Illustrated by the History of the Achaean 
League. 

(1 . Its composition. (2). Results. 
I 1 . Composition of Achaean League. 
l m . Powers of cities composing the League. 



bawson's foederalist. 49 



50 



l tt . They retained their municipal jurisdic- 
tion. 
2 n . Appointed their own officers. 
3\ They enjoyed perfect equality. 

2 m . Powers of the General Government or 
League. 
Exercised through a Senate. 
l n . The sole and exclusive right of peace and 

war. 
2 n . The sole and exclusive right of sending and 

receiving ambassadors. 
3*. Of making treaties and alliances. 
4 n . Of appointing a Praetor or Chief Magis- 
trate. 

(1). Praetor commanded the armies. 
(2). By the advice and consent often Sena- 
tors administering the government in the re- 
cess of the Senate. 

(3). Had a share in its deliberation when 
it was assembled. 

2 1 . Results of the Form of Government under 
the Achaean League. 

l m . As well after the renovation of the League 
by Aratus as before its dissolution by the 
art of Macedon there was infinitely 

(1) More moderation and justice in its Gov- 
ernment; and 

(2) Less violence and sedition among people 
than were to be found in any of the cities ex- 
ercising singly all the prerogatives of sov- 
ereignty. 

2 m . Through jealousy of their power. 

(1). The successors of Alexander and Philip 
practiced divisions among them. Some of the 
cities fell under Macedonian power and others 
under local tyrants. 

(2). The Achaean League reunited, but was 
defeated through jealousy of Sparta and 
Athens. 



dawson's foederalist. 51 



52 dawson's foederalist. 

3 k . Illustrated from the History of the Germanic 
(1). Origin of the League. (2). Its composi- 
tion. (3). Results in the case of this League. 

I 1 . Origin of the Germanic League. 

Formerly Germany was inhabited by seven 
distinct and independent nations ; one of these, 
the Franks, conquered France and under Charle- 
magne in the ninth century, conquered Germany 
and established the empire. On the dismem- 
berment under his sons, Germany became a sep- 
arate and independent empire. The principal 
vassals gradually threw off the yoke. Out of 
this feudal system has grown the Federal Sys- 
tem, which constitutes the Germanic Empire. 

2 1 . The Composition of the Germanic League. 

(1). The governmental functions — how vested. 

(2). The powers of the Diet. (3). Restrictions 

on the States. (4). The powers of the Emperor. 

l m . The Government Functious, how vested. 

l n . In a Diet, representing the members of 

the Confederacy. 
2\ In the Emperor — the executive. 
3\ In the Imperial Chamber and Aulic coun- 
cil. 
* 2 m . The Powers of the Diet. 

l n . The general power of legislating for the 

Empire. 
2 n . To make war and peace. 
3 n . To contract alliances, (p. 121). 
4 n . To assess quotas of troops and money. 
5\ To construct fortresses. 
6 n . To regulate coin. 
7 n . To admit new members. 
8 n . To subject disobedient members to ban of 

empire. 
3 m . Restrictions on the States. 
l n . To make treaties contrary to the good 
of the Empire. 



DAWSON'S FOEDERAU©T» 53 



54 dawson's foederalist. 

2 n . To impose tolls on inter-State commerce 
with the consent of the Emperor and Diet. 
3 n . To alter the value of money. 
4 n . To do injustice to another. 
5 n . To afford refuge to disturbers of the pub- 
lic peace. 
4 m . The powers of the Emperor. 
l n . To make propositions to the Diet. 
2 n . To veto resolutions of the Diet. 
3 n . To nominate ambassadors. 
4 n . To confer dignities and titles. 
5 n . To fill vacant electorates. 
6 n . To found universities. 
7\ To grant privileges not injurious to the 

empire. 
8 n To receive and .apply the public funds. 
9 n . To watch over the public safety. 
3 l . Results of the Form of Government under 
the Germanic League. 

l m . Wars between the Emperor and the State. 
In the sixteenth century the Emperor and 
one part of the empire were arrayed against 
the other States, and once the Emperor was put 
to flight by the Elector of Saxony. 
2 m . Wars between the States themselves. 

E. g., Thirty Years War. 
3 m . This disjointed machine barely holds 
together and that (1) because of the fear the 
principal component States have of the sur- 
rounding Nations; (2) from the obvious in- 
terests and pride of the Emperor. 
6 k . Illustrated from the History of Poland. 
I 1 . The composition of the Polish Government. 

A government over local sovereigns. 
2 1 . Results of this Form of Government in 
Poland. 

Unfit for government or self-defence, it was 
dismembered. 



dawson's foedbraust. 55 



56 



7 k . Illustrated from the History of the Swiss 
Cantons. 

I 1 . The composition of their Government. 

(1). Their Government not a Confederacy. 
(2). Reasons for its duration. 

l m . The Government of the Swiss Cantons not 
a Confederacy. 

l n . There is no common treasury. 
2 n . No common Judicatory. 
3 n . No common troops. 
4*. No common coin. 
5 n . No other work of sovereignty. 
2 m . Reasons for its duration, (p. 125) 
l n . Topographical position. 
2 n . Weakness and insignificance. 
2 1 . Results of this form of Government of the 
Swiss cantons. 
l m . In ordinary cases. 

Very satisfactory. 
2 m . In cases of dispute or real trial. 

Proved a failure. Result has been three 
bloody religious wars. Protestant and Cath- 
olic cantons have separate Diets; counter 
leagues with foreign States. 
8 k . Illustrated from the History of the United 
Netherlands or Belgic Confederation. 
(1). Composition of the Government. (2). 
Results. 
I 1 . Composition of the Government. 

(1). Its origin and general nature. (2). In 
what authorities vested. (3). Powers of each. 
(4). Restrictions on States. 
l m . Origin and general nature. 

A confederacy of seven co-equal and sovereign 
States ; each State is composed of equal and 
independent cities. In all important cases the 
States, provinces and cities must be unani- 
mous. 



dawson's foederalist. 57 



58 dawson's foederalist. 

2 m . The Go vernment of United Netherlands— 
in what authorities vested. 

l n . The States General. 

They represent the sovereignty of the Re- 
public and consist of about fifty delegates 
appointed by States, some for one, some for 
two, three and six years, for life and for pleas- 
ure. 

2 n . The Stadtholder. 

Chief executive, a hereditary Prince ; salary 
300,000 florins. 

3 m . Powers of these several authorities. 
l n . Of the States General. 
1°. To make treaties. 
2°. To make war and peace. 
3°. To raise armies and equip fleets. 
4°. To ascertain quotas and demand contri- 
butions, provided, they unanimously agree 
and have the consent of their constituents. 
2 n . Of the Stadtholder. 
1°. He is a hereditary Prince. 
2°. Is Stadtholder in each State and for the 
Union. 

l p . Powers as Stadtholder in each State or 
Province. 

l q . He appoints town magistrates. 
2 q . Executes provincial decrees. 
3 q . Presides, at pleasure, in the provincial 

tribunal. 
4 q . Has power of pardon. 
2 P . Powers as Stadtholder for the Union. 
l q . Commander-in-Chief of the armies. 
2 q . Admiral general of the navy. 
4 m . Restrictions on the States or members of 
the United Netherlands. 

l n . They are not allowed, except by general 
consent, to make foreign treaties. 



dawson's foedbraust. 59 



60 dawson's foederalist. 

2 n . From establishing imposts injurious to 

each other. 
3 n . From charging their neighbors higher 
duties than their subjects. 
2 1 . Results under the Government of United 

Netherlands. 

l m . Imbecility in the Government; discord 

v among the Provinces. 

2 m . Deficiencies in quotas are often collected 
at the point of the bayonet. 

3 m . Foreign ministers elude matters taken ad 
referendum, by tampering with the provinces 
and cities, e g. In 1726 the treaty of Han- 
over was so delayed a whole year. 

4 m . In critical emergencies the States General 
must often over-leap the Constitution, 
(p. 132). 

2°. Second defect in the Articles of Confederation. Total 
want of a sanction to its laws. 

l d Nature of a Sanction. 
It prescribes the punishment for disobedience. 

2 d . Power of enforcing laws not given to the Govern- 
ment. 

l e . Such a power not expressly given. 
2°. The Articles of Confederation declare " Each State 
shall retain every power, jurisdistion and right not 
expressly delegated to the United States in Con- 
gress assembled. 
3 d . Consequences of this Defect. 

The United States is a Government destitute of 
every Constitutional means of enforcing its laws. 
3 C . Third defect in the Articles of Confederation : The 
want of a mutual guaranty of the State Govern- 
ments. 

(1) Nature of a Mutual Guaranty. (2) Consequences 
of this defect and (3) certain objections answered. 
l d . Nature of a Mutual Guaranty of the State Gov- 
ernments. 



dawson's foederalist. 61 



62 dawson's foederalist. 

It is an authority given to the general Government 
to protect the States from violent attempts to over- 
throw their State Governments. 

2 d . Consequences of this Defect. 

The Union can render no assistance in a State in re- 
pelling domestic dangers. E. g., Shay's Rebellion in 
Massachusetts. 

3 d . Objection that this Mutual Guaranty will allow 
officious intermeddling on the part of the United 
States Government. 
l e . This objection would deprive us of one of the 

greatest advantages of the Union. 
2 e . It proceeds from misapprehension of the provi- 
sion. 
3 e . There will be little pretence for such interference 
in a Government where the whole power is in the 
people, (p. 135.) 
4 C . Fourth defect in the Articles of Confederation : Reg- 
ulating Contributions to the Treasury by Quotas. 
(1) Nature of this defect. (2) Consequences and (3) 
Remedy. 
l d . Nature of this defect. 

There is no common standard or barometer by which 
the degrees of Constitutional wealth can be ascer- 
tained. (1) Neither the value of lands, nor (2) the 
numbers of the people, which have been proposed as 
the ratio of State contribution, is a just representa- 
tive. 
E.g., Compare Holland and Russia; Virginia and 

North Carolina. 
2 d . Consequences. . 

1°. There can be no common measure of national 

wealth. 
2°. Quotas are productive of glaring inequality and 

oppression. 
3 e . Such inequality would work the destruction of 

the Union. 
3 d . Remedy for this Defect. 
Is by allowing the National Union to raise its own 



dawson's foederalist. 63 



64 dawson's foederalist. 

revenues in its own way, either by (1) direct, or (2) 
indirect taxation, (pp. 137-138). 
l e . Power in the Government of Direct Taxation. 

Apportionment according to the number of people. 
This is not the preferable mode. 
2 e . Power in the Government of Indirect Taxation. 

(1). The amount to be contributed by each citizen 
will in great measure be at his own option. 

(2). They contain in their own nature a security 
against excess. 

If duties are too high, consumption is lessened and 
the revenue is lessened. 

5 C . Fifth Defect in the Articles of Confederation : The 
Want of a Power to Regulate Commerce. 

l d . The Utility of such a Power. 

Foed., p. 139 and seq. 
2 d . The Consequences of the Want of Such a Power. 

(1) In our foreign relations. (2) In our domestic 
relations. 
l e . In our Foreign Relations. 

The want of such a power has pre vented beneficial 
treaties with foreign nations, (p. 139). 
E. g., Mr. Jenkinson's bill in the House of Commons. 
2 e . In our Domestic Relations. 

l f . Several States, by separate prohibitions, have 
attempted to influence Great Britain to favorable 
commercial treaties, but their plans have been 
frustrated from want of concert. 
2 f . Interfering and unneighborly regulations. 
E. g. Result in the case of the German Empire. 
6 C . Sixth Defect in Articles of Confederation : Raising 
contributions of Troops by Quotas. 
(1). Result of the system of quotas in general and 
(2) in the war of Independence. 
l d . The result of the system of quotas in general. 

A system of imbecility in the Union ; inequality 
among States. 

2 d . The Result of this system in the War of Indepen- 
dence, (p. 140.) 



dawson's foederalist. 65 



66 dawson's foederalist. 

(1). Replete with obstructions to a vigorous and 
economic defence. (2) Unequal in its burdens on the 
States. 
l e . Replete with obstructions to a vigorous and econ- 
omical defence. 

l f . Created an auction of men. 
2 f . Bounties grew to an enormous size. 
3 f . Men delayed enlisting to get a larger price and 

for short periods. 
4 f . Slow and scanty levies and fluctuations in the 

troops. 
5 f . Oppressive expedients for raising troops. 
2 e . This system unequal in its burdens. 

Especially unjust on the States near the seat of 
war. 
7 C . Seventh Defect in Articles of Confederation : Equal 
Suffrage Among the States. 

(1). Nature of this defect. (2). Certain objections 
answered. 

l d . Nature of This Defect. 

l e . Every idea of proportion and every rule of fair 
representation conspire to condemn a principle 
which gives equal votes to Rhode Island and New 
York. 
2 e . It contradicts that fundamental maxim of Re- 
publican Government : " Let the majority rule." 
2 d . Certain objections answered. 

(1). "That Sovereigns are equal." (2). "That a 
two-thirds vote is required for the most important 
resolutions and two-thirds of the States contain a 
majority of the people." 
(p. 142). 

l e . "That Sovereigns are equal and that a majority 
of the States are a majority of Confederate Amer- 
ica." 
l f . This maxim is contrary to justice and common 

sense. 
2 f . This maxim is false in fact. 
E. g., 1, New Hampshire; 2, Rhode Island; 3, New 



67 



68 dawson's foederalist. 

Jersey ; 4, Delaware ; 5, Georgia ; 6, South Carolina ; 
7, Maryland, are a majority of States, but they do 
not contain one-third of the people. 
2 e . "That two-thirds of the States are required for 
the most important resolutions and that these two- 
thirds would be a majority." 
l f . This still allows the States an equal vote. 
2 f . This statement false in fact. 

E. g., New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Car- 
olina, Georgia, New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware, 
New York and Connecticut are two-thirds of the 
States and are less than a majority. 
3 f . The mischiefs attending this rule. 

(1). In the ordinary operations of the Govern- 
ment. (2) The danger of foreign corruption. 
l g . In the ordinary operations of the Government. 
It gives a minority a negative upon the majority ; 
one-sixtieth of the Union (Delaware and Rhode 
Island) has often been a bar to the operations of 
the Government. 

2 s . From the danger of foreign corruption, (p. 147). 
l h . This danger is one of the great weaknesses of 

Republics. 
2\ Foreigners would have only one-third to buy 
— in a majority one-half. 
8 e . Eighth Defect in the Articles of Confederation : 
Want of a Judiciary Power. 

l d . To give meaning and uniformity to the Laws and 
Treaties of the United States. 

2 d . As a protection to the General Government against 
the States. 
9 C . Ninth Defect in Articles of Confederation : The Or- 
ganization of Congress improper for the exercise of all 
the Functions of Government. 
10 c . Tenth Defect of Articles of Confederation : Never 
Ratified by the People. 
(1). Nature of this defect. (2). Remedy. 
l d . Nature of this Defect. 
The articles having been ratified by the Legislatures 



dawson's foederalist. 



69 



70 



of the States, it has been contended that the same au- 
thority might repeal the lawratifying them. (p. 149). 
2 d . Remedy for This Defect. 

The fabric of America's empire ought to rest on the 
solid basis of the consent of the people. 
3 a . The Necessity of a Government at Least Equally- 
Energetic with the One Proposed to Preserve the 
Union. 

(1). The objects to be provided for by the Federal Gov- 
ernment. (2). The persons on whom the power should 
operate. (3). The quantity of power necessary to the ac- 
complishment of those objects. 

l b . The objects to be provided for by the Foederal Gov- 
ernment. 
l e . The common defence of the members. 

2 C . The Preservation of Public Peaceas well as Against 
Internal Convulsions as External Attacks. 

3 C . The regulation of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. 
4 C . The superintendence of our intercourse, political 

and commercial, with foreign countries, (p. 150). 
2 b . The persons on whom the Governmental powers 
should operate. 

It was shown (Foed., p. 94 and seq.) 
that legislation for States in their corporate capacity 
was the radical defect of the Articles of Confederation ; 
and that the Government could only operate success- 
fully on individuals. 

3 b . The Quantity of Powers in General Government 
Necessary to Accomplish the Objects of Union — w. c. 
(1). In respect to common defence. (2). Taxation. 
(3). Regulating militia. 

l c . The quantity of powers in the General Go vernment 
necessary to accomplish the objects of Union in re- 
spect to common defence. 

(1). The several authorities necessary to the care of 
common defence. (2). The extent of those authorities 
and reasons therefor. (3). Certain objections thereto. 
l d . The several authorities necessary to the care of 
the common defence. 



71 



72 dawson's foederalist. 

l e . To Raise Armies. 
2 e . To Build and Equip Fleets. 
3 e . To Prescribe Rules for Their Government. 
4°. To Direct Their Operations. 
5 e . To Provide for Their Support, (p. 151). 
2 d . The extent of those authorities and reasons there- 
for. 

l e . The Extent of Those Authorities. 
They should exist without limitation. 

2 e . Reasons for unlimited extent of those authorities 
l f . Because it is impossible to foresee or define the 
extent and variety of national exigencies; 

2 f . Or to foresee the extent and variety of means nec- 
essary to satisfy those exigencies. 

3 f . This principle recognized in the Articles of Con- 
federation. 

3 d . Certain objections to unlimited extent of author- 
ities of Government in providing for common de- 
fence answered. 

(1). "In tending to foster standing armies." 
(2). " In not vesting these authorities in the State 
Governments." (3). "The proposed Government will 
require force." 

l e . "In tending to foster standing armies." (p. 156). 
Objection answered. 

(1). The source of this objection. (2). Objection 
answered. 
l f . The source of this objection, (p. 170). 

It comes from the jealousy which our English an- 
cestors had of standing armies when the authori- 
ties for raising them was vested, not in the legisla- 
ture, as under proposed Constitution, but in the 
executive, and from their failure to note the distinc- 
tion between vesting this power in the executive 
and in the people's representatives. 
2 f . Objection Answered. 

(1). The authorities for raising armies— where 
vested. (2). The safeguards provided by the vari- 



dawson's foederalist. 73 



74 dawson's foederalist. 

ous State Constitutions by the Articles of Confeder- 
ation and by the United States Constitution superi- 
ority of the latter. (3). The danger of fettering the 
Government in raising armies and necessity for such 
authority. 

1*. The Authorities for Raising Armies — where 
vested. 

In the Legislature (Congress) and not in the 
President, (p. 156). 

2 s . The safeguards provided by the various State 
Constitutions, by the Articles of Confederation 
and by the United States Constitution superi- 
ority of the latter. 

1\ The safeguards provided by various State 
Constitutions, by Articles of Confederation and 
by the United States Constitution. 

l j . By the Constitutions of the various States. 

1\ In Pennsylvania and North Carolina. 

"Standing armies in time of peace ought not 
to be kept up." 

2 k . By the Constitutions of the remaining States . 

No provision whatever. 
2 J . Safeguards provided by the Articles of Con- 
federation. 
None whatever. 
3 j . Safeguards provided by the United States 
Constitution. 

By vesting in Congress the power to raise and 
support armies, " but no appropriation of money 
to that use shall be for a longer term than two 
years" 

2 h . The superiority of the safeguards provided by 

the United States Constitution. 

(It is more than a parchment barrier— it takes 

away the means of keeping up an army) . (p. 171 . ) 

l j . It causes the subject to be reconsidered every 

two years. 
2 j . Schemes for sub verting the liberties of thepeo- 



dawson's foederalist. 75 



76 



pie require more time for maturing than this 
provision allows, (p. 174). 
3 g . The Danger of Fettering the Government in re- 
gard to Standing Armies and the necessity for such 
Authorities in the Government. 
l h . The Danger of Fettering the Government in 
regard to Standing Armies. 
(1). As regards keeping up of standing armies. 
(2). As regards raising armies. 
l j . As regards keeping up Standing Armies. 

Because of the uncertainty of the period or ex- 
tent of the danger to be guarded against. 
2 j . As regards Raising Armies in times of Peace. 
1\ The United States would then exhibit the ex- 
traordinary spectacle of a nation incapaci- 
tated by her Constitution for preparing for de- 
fence before actually invaded, (p. 166). 
2 b . She would be forced to depend on the militia 
which : 

(1). Well nigh lost us our Independence. 
(2). Which is more expensive than a regular 
army. 
(3). Less efficient than a regular army. 
2\ The necessity for such authorities in the Gen- 
eral Government. 
l j . Because of the danger from Indian, Spanish 

and English hostilities. 
2 j . To provide a Navy for protecting our grow- 
ing commerce. 
3 J . In cases of internal violence. 
l k . Pennsylvania, notwithstanding her bill of 
rights, was forced to resort to an army to put 
down insurrection, and still keeps up the army. 
(P- 167). 
2 k . Massaschusetts, notwithstanding the Arti- 
cles of Confederation, did the same. 
2\ Objection that " These Authorities for Raising 
Armies were not vested in the State Governments." 
l f . Such a doctrine would be a subversion of the 



dawson's foederalist. 77 



78 dawson's foederalist. 

primary principle of Union — i. e., the protection of 
all through the Union — by transferring this protec- 
tion to the individual and component members. 

2 f . It would be oppressive to some States and too 
light on others. 

3 f . It would become dangerous to all the States — 
through weakness of some, from the military es- 
tablishments of others. 

4 f . It would be dangerous to the Union. 
3 9 . Objection that " the proposed Government cannot 
be exercised without force" answered, (1) The pro- 
posed Go vernment will be better administered than 
the State Governments, and will therefore have the 
popular confidence; (2) It will be less likely to 
require force than the present Government; (3) 
There may be times in all Governments when force 
must be used. (p. 176).. 

l f . The proposed Government will be better admin- 
istered than the State Governments. 

l g . From the greater latitudes of choice in the se- 
lection of its officers. 

2 s . From the peculiar care with which the Presi- 
dent and Senate will be chosen. 

3 g . Congress will be less exposed to the momentary 
whims of the people than the State Legislatures 
— being more intelligent and farther distant. 

4 K . From the greater strength of the General Gov- 
ernment, (p. 178). 

2 f . The proposed Government is less likely to re- 
quire force than the present Government, chiefly 
from its operation upon individuals instead of upon 
States, as in the case of the latter, (p. 180 and seq). 

3 f . There may be Times when Force must be used. 

l g . Illustrations. 

l h Massachusetts and Pennsylvania under the 

Articles of Confederation. 
2\ If the thirteen States were divided into sev- 



dawson's foederalist. 79 



80 dawson's foederalist. 

eral confederacies would not each be liable to the 
same casualty, (p. 183). 

2 g . Safety of the people under the Proposed Gov- 
ernment on such occasions. 

1\ Through their representatives in Congress, who 
regulate the force to be used. 

2 h . Through the jealousy of the State Govern- 
ments, (p. 185). 

3\ Through the great extent of the Union. 

4\ Through the impracticability of raising a Gov- 
ernment force large enough to overrun the coun- 
try. 
2 C . The quantity of power in the General Government 
necessary to accomplish the objects of Union in re- 
spect of Taxation. 

(1). The necessity for a power of taxation. (2). The 
extent of the power. 

l d . The Necessity for a Power of Taxation. 
1*. In General. 

l f . Prevents official plunder — such as exists in the 
Turkish Empire — from lack of this power. 

2 f . Prevents that atrophy and dissolution of Gov- 
ernment. 
2 e . In Particular. 

l f . In providing for military operations and ar- 
rangements. 
2 f . In providing support of the National Civil List. 
3 f . In paying the National debts. 
4 f . To meet any other exigencies. 
2 d . The Extent of the Power of Taxation. 
It may be (1) limited, or (2) unlimited. 
l e . Limited Powers of Taxation. 

(1). Several ways in which the powers of taxation 
may be limited. (2). The effect of such limitations. 
l f . The Several Ways in which the Powers of Tax- 
ation may be limited. 
(1). To external taxation. (2). Partly to exter- 



Dawson's fobderalist. 81 



82 



mal and partly to requisitions. (3). To particular 
objects. 

2*. The Effect of Such Limitations. 
l g . In case of Limitations to External Taxation. 

1\ Violates the maxim, " Every power should be 
co-extensive with its objects ; " the exigencies of 
the Government being incapable of limitation, 
the means of vesting them should be. (p. 189). 

2\ External taxation may be insufficient. 

l j . To supply present necessities. 

2 J . Much more, to supply present necessities. 

2 s . In case of Limitation partly to External Taxa- 
tion and partly to Requisitions. 

1\ This is an Admission that External Taxation 
may not suffice. 

2\ It exposes the Government in case of a failure 
in external taxation to the evils of requisitions, 
(p. 135). 

l j . The General Effect of Requisitions. 

(p. 135). 
2 j . The Effect of Requisitions in Time of War. 

If external taxes should suffice for ordinary ex- 
igencies, requisitions must be resorted to in time 
of war. 
1\ Necessitates the diversion of funds already 

appropriated for other purposes to supply the 

pressing demands of war. 

2 k . Will destroy public credit, (p. 191). 

The means of the Government for paying her 
debts being so restricted loans will be hard to 
get and heavy to support. 
3 s . In case of Limitation to Particular Objects. 

(1). The oppression of particular branches of in- 
dustry. 

(2). Unequal distribution of taxes. 
1\ The Oppression of Particular Branches of In- 
dustry, (p. 216). 



dawson's foederalist. 83 



84 dawson's foederalist. 

E. g., Consider the result of exorbitant duties 
on imported articles: High Tariff, (p. 216). 
l j . Smuggling. 

2 3 ' They make " barons" of manufacturers. 
3 J . They force industry out of its natural chan- 
nels. 
4\ They often oppress the merchant. 
5 J . They are more often oppressive to the con- 
sumers. 
2 h . From an Unequal Distribution of Taxes. 

The manufacturing States, in case of duties on 
imported articles, would contribute cash to the 
general revenue. 
2 e . Unlimited Powers of Taxation. 

(1). Advantages of unlimited powers. (2). Objec- 
tions answered. 
l f . Advantages of Unlimited Powers of Taxation. 
The limited powers being inadequate, the unlim- 
ited are necessary. 

2 f . Certain Objections to Unlimited Powers of Tax- 
ation Answered. 

(1) That "such powers would interfere with State 
levies;" (2) that the power of Congress "to make 
all laws which shall be necessary and proper for ex- 
ecuting the powers vested in the Government by the 
Constitution" is improper; (3) that the clause of 
the Constitution, "the Constitution and laws of the 
United States, made in pursuance thereof, shall he 
the Supreme law of the land, " is objectionable. 
l g . That "Such Powers would Interfere with State 
Levies. 

(1). The security against oppression by the Gov- 
ernment in the matter of taxation ; (2) the instances 
of exclusive powers vested in the Government ; (3) 
the concurrent powers, (p. 198). 
l h . The Securities against Oppression by the Gen- 
eral Government in the matter of Taxation. 
l j . The Sense of the People. 
2 j . The State Governments. 



dawson's fobderalist. 85 



86 dawson's foederalist. 

3'. The Conviction of the Utility of Local Admin- 
istrations for Local Purposes. 
2 h . The Three Instances of Exclusive Powers 
vested in the Government. 

The present Government is only a Partial Union 
or Consolidation and the State Governments re- 
tain all the powers not exclusively granted to the 
General Government, (p. 199). 
1 J . Where the Constitution in express terms 

granted an exclusive authority to the Govern- 
ment. 

E. g., Art. L, §8: "Congress shall exercise ex- 
clusive legislation over the District of Columbia." 
2 J . Where, in one place, the Constitution grants 

a Power to the Government and prohibits it, 

to the the States. 

E. g., Art. F., § 8-1 : " Congress shall have 
power to lay and collect duties, imposts and ex- 
cises." 

Art. I., §10-2: ' 'No State shall, without con- 
sent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on 
imports or exports, except for executing its in- 
spection laws." 
3 j . Where an authority is granted to the Union, 

to which the same authority in the States would 

be contradictory and repugnant. 

E. g. " Congress shall have power to establish 
uniform rules of naturalization." (p. 200). 
3\ The Concurrent Power — e. g., that of Taxa- 
tion on Articles other than Exports and Imports. 
1 J . This power has not been exclusively granted 

to the Government. 
2 j . It has not been prohibited to the States. 
3\ The restraint upon the States in relation to 

imports is an admission. 

(1). That if this power had not been inserted 
it would have resident in the States ; 

(2). That, as to all other taxes, the authority 
of the States is undiminished. 
4 J . It is not repugnant. 



dawson's foederalist. 87 



88 Dawson's foederalists 

5 J . Concurrent jurisdiction in certain cases re- 
sults from the division of the Sovereign Power 
between the State and Foederal Governments. 

6 j . Art. I., §10, consists entirely of restrictions on 
the States— of which number that of taxation 
is not one. 

2 g . That "the power of Congress to make all laws 
necessary and proper for executing the powers 
vested in the Government by the Constitution" 
is improper. 
1\ This power results by implication. 

2\ It was expressed out of abundant caution and 

as a protection against State encroachments, (p. 

204-5. 
3\ The propriety and necessity of the laws will be 

judged, as in the case of the grant of power it- 

self. 

(1). Primarily by the Government. 

(2). Next by the people. 
3 g . That the clause, "the Constitution and laws of 
the United States made in pursuance thereof shall 
be the Supreme Law of the Land," is objection- 
able. 

The Constitution and laws of the United States 
are necessarily supreme. 
1\ Their supremacy results from the nature of 

laws and the association of the people in one 

government. 
2\ The laws of the United States are supreme 

only when made in pursuance of the Constitu- 
tion. 
4 g . " That the House of Representatives will be too 
small to contain representatives of all tax-pay- 
ing classes." 
1\ The number of members in the House of Rep* 

resentatives is neither too large nor too small. 

(p. 403). 
2\ The representation by classes Impracticable. 
Unless the Constitution should expressly pro* 



89 



90 dawson's foederalist. 

vide that each occupation should send one or 

more, members it would never take place. 

(1). Merchants will most likely be the repre- 
sentatives of mechanics and manufacturers from 
their greater intelligence and from the similarity 
of their trades. 

(2). Doctors, lawyer, etc., form no distinct inter- 
ests and their selection will depend on their situa- 
tion and talents. 

(3). The landed interests will vote for those in 
whom they have the most confidence. 

3\ The representation by classes Unnecessary (p. 

220-224.) 
5 g . "That the Power of Internal Taxation in the 
Government will be poorly exercised from want 
of proper knowledge of local circumstances." 

1\ The members of Congress from each State 
will have the proper knowledge; as in State 
Legislatures, the county representatives. 

2\ The knowledge required is general. 

3 h . Revenue laws are generally framed by compe- 
tent boards or committees, adapted especially 
for the work. 

3 e . The Quantity of Powers in the General Government 
Necessary to Accomplish the Objects of Union with 
respect to Regulating the Militia, (p. 221). 

(1). The terms of this grant. 

(2). The reason for this grant of power. 

(3). Does not supersede the posse comitatus. 

(4). The safeguards against an abuse of this power 
l d . The Terms of This Grant. 

"Congress shall have power to provide for organ- 
sizing, arming and disciplining the militia and for 
" governing such part of them as may be employed in 
"the service of the United States, reserving to the 
"States respectively the appointment of the officers 
"and the authority of training the militia according 
" to the discipline prescribed by Congress." 
2 d . The Reason for the Grant of Such a Power. 



91 



92 dawson's foederalist. 

l e . Uniformity in the organization and discipline of 

the militia, when called into service for the public 

defence, can only be accomplished by confiding the 

regulation of the militia to the Government, (p. 231). 

2 C . It will tend to prevent large standing armies. To 

render an army unnecessary will be a more certain 

method of preventing its existence than a thousand 

prohibitions on paper. 

3 d . The Grant of This Power Will Not Supersede the 

Posse Comitatus. 

The power of calling out the posse comitatus to as- 
sist the magistrate in the execution of his duty re- 
sults from the clause empowering Congress to pass 
all laws necessary and proper to execute the declared 
powers of the Government, (p. 233). 
4 d . The Safeguards Against an Abuse of This Power. 
1*. The militia would consist of but a small part of 
the population called, from their avocations at in- 
tervals for drill and discipline. 
2°. Being our sons, brothers and neighbors they 
would not be a source of oppression, but rather of 
protection. 
3 e . The States and not the Government will have the 

appointment of the officers, (p. 236). 
4\ The States and not the Government will have 
authority to train them, though the tactics maybe 
prescribed by Congress. 
4 a . The Conformity of the Proposed Constitution to the 
True Principles of Republican Government. 
(1). Introductory. (2). A survey of the proposed Con- 
stitution. 
l b . Introductory. 

(1). The character of the persons to whom this sur- 
vey is directed. (2). The inducements to a fair and 
charitable consideration of the Constitution. 
l c . The character of the persons to whom this survey 
is directed. 

Neither to the predetermined friend nor the prede- 
termined enemy (the first of whom may be upright, the 
second must be culpable) ; but to those who add to a 



dawson's foederalist. 93 



94 dawson's foederalist. 

sincere zeal for the kappiness of their country, a tem- 
per favorable to a just estimate of the means of pro- 
moting it. (p. 240). 

2°. The inducements to a fair and charitable consider- 
ation of the Constitution. 

(1). The difficulties encountered by the convention 
framing the Constition. (2). In every case reported by 
ancient history in which a Government has been estab- 
lished with deliberation and consent it has been framed 
by a single individual. (3). The defect of the Consti- 
tution are the result of defects of antecedent experi- 
ence, and not of a want of care in preparing it. (4). 
The present situation of America. 

l d . The difficulties encountered by the convention 
framing the Constitution. 

1*. The novelty of the undertaking. 

2\ The difficulty of combining the Requisite Stability 
and Energy in the Government with a due regard 
to Liberty and the Republican form. 

3 e . The difficulty of marking the proper line of parti- 
tion between the authority of the Government and 
that of the States. 

4 e . The difficulty of reconciling the interfering pre- 
tensions of the larger and smaller States. 

5 e . The difficulty arising from conflicting interests in 
the States because of a difference in locality and 
policy, (p. 245). 

2 d . In every case reported by ancient history in which 
a Government has been established from delibera- 
tion and consent it has been by a single individual, 
(p. 247). 

3 d . The defects in the Constitution are the result of a 
defect of antecedent experience and not of a want of 
care. 

4 d . The present situation of America considered, (p. 
250). 

l e . The Severity of her Malady. 
2 e . The Diversity of the Advice. 



95 



96 dawson's foederalist. 

4 C . The proposed Constitution is an improvement 
on the Articles of Confederation. 

5 e . The principal objections to the Constitution lie 
with greater force against the Articles of Confeder- 
ation. 
2 b . A Survey of the Proposed Constitution. 

(1). A Republican form of Government demanded by 
the genius of the American people. (2). The distinctive 
characters of the Republican form. (3). The Govern- 
ment proposed conforms to those characters. (4). The 
character of the Government, as to whether it is Foed- 
eral or National in form. (5). The constitution consid- 
ered. (6). Objections. 

l c . A Republican form of Government demanded by 
the genius of the American people. 

l d . No other form of Government is reconcilable with 
the fundamental principles of the Revolution, (p. 
258). 
2 d . This form demanded by that honorable determin- 
ation which animates every votary of freedom, to 
rest all our political experiments on the capacity of 
mankind for self government. 
2 C . The distinctive characters of the Republican form. 
l d . Republican Government Defined. 

A Government which derives all its powers directly 
or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is 
administered by persons holding" their offices during 
pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. 
2 d . The Essentials of the Republican Form. 

That it be derived from the great body of the so- 
ciety, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a 
favored class of it. 
3 d . What is Sufficient to Republican Form. 

That the persons administering it be appointed, 
either directly or indirectly, by the people, and that 
they hold their appointments during pleasure for a 
limited time or during good behavior. 
3 C . The Government proposed conforms to those dis- 
tinctive characters of Republican form. 



dawson's foederalist. 97 



98 



3*. Improbability that those who object to the Con- 
stitution could improve it. 

l d . As Regards the Essentials of Republican Form. 

l e . The House of Representatives is elected directly 
by the people, as is the case in most of the States. 

2 9 . The Senate, like the Present Congress and the 
Senate of Maryland, is appointed indirectly by the 
people, i. e., through the State Legislatures. 

3 e . The President is chosen through electors, indi- 
rectly by the people. 

4 e . The Judges and all other officers of the Govern- 
ment will be chosen indirectly by the people. 

2 d . As regards the characters sufficient to the Repub- 
lican form. 
l e . The House of Representatives is elected for two 

years. 
2\ The Senate is elected for six years. 

3\ The President is elected for four years and is im- 
peachable in office. 
4\ The Judges hold during good behavior. 
3 e . In Prohibiting Titles of Nobility. 
4 C . The character of the Government, as to whether it 
is Foederal or National in form. 
(1). The nature of Foederal and National Govern- 
ment respectively. (2). The real character of the Gov- 
ernment as respects the National or Foederal form. 
(3). The authority of the convention to propose such 
a Government. (4). How far the duty they owed to 
their country could supply any defect of authority. 

l d . The nature of Foederal and National Governments 
Respectively, (p. 261). 
l e . The Foederal Form — regards to the Union as a 

Confederacy of Sovereign States. 
2 6 . The National form regards the Union as a Con- 
solidation of the States. 
2 d . The real character of the Government as respects 
the National or Foederal form. 



dawson's foederalist. 99 



100 dawson's foederalist. 

(1). As treated by Mr. Gilmore; (2) as treated in the 
Foederalist. 
l e . As treated by Mr. Gilmore. 

The Government is Foederal in every respect. The 
House of Representatives (contrary to Foed., p. 
263), is Foederal in its election ; for, in determining 
the number of Representatives in Congress, the pop- 
ulation of each State separately is divided by 173,- 
000 to determine its present representation. (Mill's 
Republican Government, p. 301 ; Freeman's History 
of Foederal Government, L, pp. 11— 12; Taylor's Ori- 
gin and Growth of the English Constitution, p. 50). 
2 e . As treated in the Foederalist (i. e., the real char- 
acter of the Government as regards the Foederal 
and National Form. 

(1) The foundation on which the Government is 
established ; (2) the sources from which its ordinary 
powers are drawn; (3) the operation of those pow- 
ers; (4) the extent of those powers; (5) the author- 
ity on which future changes in the Government are 
to be introduced. 
l f . The Foundation on which the Government is 
Established. 

It is Foederal, for the assent of a majority of all 
the people of the United States will not establish 
the Government over all; but the unanimous assent 
of the several States that are parties to it. 
2 f . The sources from which the ordinary powers of 
the Government are to be Drawn. 
l c . The House of Representatives : National. (See 

Contra, l e Supra.) 
2 g . The Senate: Foederal. 
3 g . The Executive: Partly Foederal and partly 

National. 
3 f . The Operations of those Powers. 

Chiefly National ; party Foederal. as in trial of con- 
troversies in which States are parties. 
4? f . The Extent of those Powers. 

In this respect the Government is Foederal, since 
the local or municipal authorities for indistinct and 



102 dawson's foederalist. 

independent portions of the supremacy, no more sub- 
ject, within their respective spheres, to the general 
Government, than the general Government is sub- 
ject to them, within its own sphere, (p. 264). 

5 f . The authority on which future changes are to be 

introduced. 

Foederal, in computing the required proportion by 
States; National, in rendering the concurrence of less 
than the whole number of States sufficient. 

3 d . The Authority of the Convention to propose such 
a Government. 

(1). The sources of that authority; (2) the terms. 
(3) their construction. 

l e . The Sources of that Authority. 

Derived from the commissions of the members of 
the convention which referred either, (1) to the recom- 
mendation from the meeting at Annapolis, in Sep- 
tember, 1786, or (2) to that from Congress in Febru- 
ary, 1787. (p. 266). 

2 e . The terms of that Authority. 
l f . The Exact Terms. 

See Foederalist p. 267. 
2 f . The substance of that Authority. 
l g . To establish a firm National Government. 

2 g . To establish a Government adequate to the ex- 
igencies of the Government and the preservation 
of the Union. 
3*. To effect these objects by alterations and pro- 
visions in the Articles of Confederation. 
4 g . To report the Constitution to Congress and to 
the States. 
3 e . The construction of those Terms. 

(1). Two general rules of construction applicable 
in this case. (2). The compliance of the convention 
with those rules. 

l f . Two general rules of construction applicable in 
in this case. 
I s . " Every part of the expression ought, ifp ossi- 



103 



104 



ble, to be allowed some meaning and be made to 
conspire to some common end." (p. 268). 
2 g . " Where the several parts cannot be reconciled 
the less important should give way to the more 
important" 
2 f . The compliance of the convention with these 
rules. 

(1). The great object of the convention was to es- 
tablish an adequate National Government, and sup- 
pose they found it impossible to accomplish this ob- 
ject by alterations and provisions in the Articles of 
Confederation, referring to Rule 2 (2 g ), we take* 
the more important, the instruction to form an 
adequate National Government, and reject the less 
important, i. e., the altering, etc., of the Articles. 

(2). But this supposition is unnecessary, for, so 
long as any part of the old Articles remained, the 
object was accomplished through alterations and 
provisions in the Articles of Confederation, (p. 269). 
4 d . How far the duty the Convention owed to their 
country could supply any defect of authority, (p. 
272). 

l e . Their appreciation of the crisis of affairs which 
led the States, as with one voice, to call the conven- 
tion. 
2 e . They were deeply and unanimously convinced of 
the necessity to establish the proposed Government. 
3 e . The assumptions by Congress of unconstitutional 
powers at times less urgent than those impelling 
the convention. 
4 e . They contemplated that the plan of Government 
was of no effect until ratified by the States gener- 
ally. 
5 C . The Constitution considered. 

(1). The sum or quantity of power which it vests in 
the Government, including the restraints on the States; 
(2) the particular structure of the Go vernment and the 
distribution of power among its several branches, (p. 
277). 
l d . The Sum or Quantity of Power which the Consti- 



DAWSON'S FOEDERAUST. 105 



106 dawson's foederalist. 

tution vests in the Government, including the Re- 
straints upon the States. 

(1) The powers transferred to the general Govern- 
ment are proper and necessary; (2) they will not be 
dangerous to the powers left in the several States. 

l f . The Powers Transferred to the General Govern- 
ment are Proper and Necessary. 
Those several classes of powers are (1) Security 
against foreign danger ; (2) regulation of intercourse 
with foreign nations; (3) maintenance of harmony 
and proper intercourse among the States ; (4) cer- 
tain miscellaneous objects of general utility; (5) 
certain restraints upon the States; (6) provisions 
for giving due efficacy to all these powers. 

l g . First Class of Powers : Providing for Security 
Against Foreign Dangers. 
The authorities comprehended in this power are : 

l g . To declare war and grant letters of marque 

and reprisal. 
2 g . To provide armies and fleets. 
3 g . To regulate and call forth the militia. 
4 s . To levy and borrow money (Gilmore's Notes, 
115). 

l k . The Extent of This Power, and Reasons There- 
for — See Foed., 187 and seq. 
2 h . Additional Argument for Not Restricting 
Levies or Taxes to External Taxation— w. c. 
(1). External taxation defined. (2). Reasons 
against such a restriction stated, (p. 285). 
l j . External Taxation Defined. 

Taxation on articles imported from other coun- 
tries. 
2 j . Reasons Against Such a Restriction Stated. 

This is, and always will be, a valuable source 
of revenue. As long as agriculture continues the 
sole field of labor the importation must increase 
as the consumers multiply ; but, as soon as do- 
mestic manufactures begin, the importation of 
manufactures will decrease as the people increase. 



dawson's foederalist. 107 



10& dawson's foederalist. 

Hereafter imports will in a great degree consist 
of raw materials, which will rather call for boun- 
ties than duties. Hence, a system of Government 
intended to endure ought to contemplate and be 
able to accommodate itself to these changes. 
3\ Reply to the Objection that the Power "to 
Lay and Collect Duties , Imposts and Excises to 
Pay the Debts, and Provide for the Common De- 
fence and General Welfare of the United States" 
amounts to an unlimited commission to exercise 
every power which may be alleged to be neces- 
sary for the common defence and general welfare. 
1 J . The objects alluded to in general terms are 
particularized immediately. 
(See United States Constitution, Art. I., sec.viii). 
If all powers were intended to be granted 
under the general terms of providing for the 
common defence and general welfare, why were 
the particular powers enumerated ? 
2 J . This language occurs in the Articles of Con- 
federation. 
2 f . Second Class of Powers : The Regulation of In- 
tercourse with Foreign Nations, (p. 288). 
l g . Power to Make Treaties. 

2 g . Power to Send and Receive Ambassadors, 
other Public Ministers and Consuls. 
3 g . Power to Define and Punish Piracies and Felo- 
nies Committed on the High Seas and Offences 
Against the Law of Nations. 
See Story on Constitution, §1164; Gilmore's 
Notes, p. 135 ; III Wheat., 339; V Wheat., 184; ib. 
76 ; 120 U. S., 678 : Forum Vol. XI., p. 235. 
4 g . Power to Regulate Foreign Commerce, includ- 
ing a Power to Prohibit, after 1808, the Importa- 
tion of Slaves, and to lay an Intermediate Duty of 
$10 per head, as a Discouragement to such Im- 
portation. 

(See Gilmore's Notes, p. 116 and seq. Foed., 
p. 291). 
3 f . Third Class of Powers: The maintenance of 



dawson's foederalist. 109 



110 dawson's foederalist. 

harmony and proper intercourse between the 

States, (p. 291). 

I s . Power to regulate commerce among the several 
States and the Indian Tribes. (Foed., p. 292 ; Gil- 
more's Notes, p. 116). 

2 s . Power to coin money, regulate the value thereof 
and of foreign coin. (p. 294 ; Gilmore's Notes, 
p. 116). 

3 g . Power to provide for the punishment of coun- 
terfeiting the current coin, securities of United 
States. See Gilmore's Notes, p. 128. 

4 g . Power to fix the standard of weights and meas- 
ures. 

5 g . Power to establish an uniform rule of natural- 
ization and uniform laws of bankruptcy, (p. 
294; Gilmore's Notes, 124). 

6 g . Power to prescribe the manners in which the 
public Acts, Records and Judicial Proceedings of 
each State shall be proved, and their effect in other 
States, (p. 296). 

7 s . Power to Establish Postoffices and Post Roads. 

4 f . Fourth Class of Powers : Certain miscellaneous 

objects of general utility, (p. 297). 

I s . Power to "Promote the Progress of Science 
"and Useful Articles by Securing for a Limited 
" Time to Authors the Exclusive Right to Their 
"Respective Writings and Discoveries." 

2 g . Power to "Exercise exclusive Legislation, in 
"all cases whatsoever, over such district {not 
"exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession 
" of particular States and the acceptance, become 
" the Seat of the Government of the United States, 
"and to exercise like authority over all places 
"purchased by the consent of the Legislatures of 
"the States in which the same shall be, for the 
"erection of Forts t Magazines, Arsenals, Dock- 
"yards and other useful buildings" — w. c. 
(1). The necessity for such a power. (2). The 

guards against its abuse. 



dawson's foederalist. Ill 



112 



1\ The necessity of such a power. 

l j . It is a power exercised by every Legislature 

of the Union. 
2 j . To secure the public authorities from insult, 

and their proceedings from interruption. 

3 j . To secure the members of the General Govern- 
ment from a dependence on the State compre- 
hending the Seat of Government for protection 
in the exercise of their duty, which might bring 
on the National Councils an imputation of awe 
or influence, (p. 298). 
2\ The guards against its abuse. 

l j . The small extent of the District. 

2 j . The territory is to be appropriated to this use 
with the consent of the State ceding it. 

3 J . The State ceding the territory will provide in 
the compact for the rights of its citizens, 
p. 298). 
4 j . The Inhabitants will have their voice in elect- 
ing the government which is to rule them ; and 
and a Municipal Legislature, for local purposes, 
will be granted them. 

Up to 1855 all voice in the affairs of the District 
of Columbia was restricted to males, free, white 
and twenty-one years old, but no legislature was 
given them until 1871. In 1867 suffrage was ex- 
tended to all, both black and white ; but the float- 
ing negro vote of 40,000 was so easily controlled 
that its government became most corrupt, ac- 
cording to Senator Ingalls, and finally bankrupt, 
and in 1871 the citizens of the District of Colum- 
bia petitioned Congress to take away their right 
of suffrage. Now, in 1894, the District is ruled 
under the direction of Congress by three Com- 
missioners. 

5 J . The authority of the ceding State to make the 
cession will be derived from the whole people of 
that State, in their adoption of that Constitu- 
tion, (p. 299). 



dawson's foederalist. 113 



114 dawson's foederalist. 

3 g . Power " to Declare the Punishment of Treason 
" but no attainder of Treason shall work corrup- 
" tion of blood, or forfeiture, except during the 
"life of the person attained." 
See Y Wheat, 97 ; IV Cranch, 75 ; II Burr's Trial, 

401, 439; Revised Statutes, U. S. §5332. 

4 g . Power to Admit New States Into the Union; 
"but no new State shall be formed or erected 
" within the jurisdiction of any other State ; nor 
"any State be formed by the junction of two or 
" more States or parts of States without the con- 
" sent of the Legislatures of the States concerned 
"as well as of the Congress." (p. 300). 
As to the constitutionality of the manner in 

which West Virginia was made a State, see Gil- 

more's Notes, p. 216 and seq. 

5*. Power to ' 'Dispose of and make all needful Rules 
"and Regulations respecting the territory and 
"other property belonging to the United States, 
"provided that nothing in the Constitution shall 
"be so construed as to prejudice any claims of 
"the United States or of any particular State. 
(See Foed. p. 300; Gilmore's Notes; Dred Scot 
case, 19 How., 393.) 

6 R . Power to "Guarantee to every State a Repub- 
"lican form of Government ; to protect each of 
" them against invasion ; and, on application of 
"the Legislature or of the Executive, {when the 
"Legislature connot be convened), against do- 
1 ' mestic violence. ' ' 
Under this clause was wrongfully claimed the 

right to reconstruct the South. (Foed. p. 301 and 

seq. ; Gilmore's Notes). 

7 g . Power to "consider all debts contracted and en- 
" gagements entered into to, before the adoption 
1 ' of this Constitution as being no less valid against 
" the United States, under this Constitution, than 
%t under the Confederation." 
(1). The nature of this power; (2) its object. (3) 

Objection, that this power does not extend to debts 

due the United States, answered. 



dawson's foederalist. 115 



116 



1\ The nature of this Power. 

It is merely declaratory. 
2\ The Objects of this Power. 

To quiet the fears of foreign creditors, because 
of the pretended doctrine that a change in the polit- 
ical form of civil society dissolves its moral obli- 
gations. 

3 b . Objection, that this power does not extend to 
debts due the United States, answered, (p. 305). 

l j . Engagements are in their nature reciprocal. 

2 j . Every Constitution must limit its precautions 
to dangers not entirely imaginary. 

3 j . The Government would not dare to remit the 
debts due the public. 

8 e . Power to " provide for amendments to be rati- 
fied by three-fourths of the States, under two ex- 
ceptions." (p. 306). ' 

9 g . Power providing that "the Ratification of the 
"conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for 
"the establishment of this Constitution between 
"the States so ratifying the same." (p. 306.) 

1\ The principles on which the Articles of Confed- 
eration, which stand in the solemn form of a 
compact among the States, can be superseded 
without the unanimous consent of the parties to 
it. (p. 307). 
l j . Because of the necessity of the case. 

The principle of self-preservation, (p. 307). 
2 j . The Articles of Confederation are but in the 
nature of a treaty, a breach of any one article 
of which, by a party to it, abrogates the treaty . 
These articles or this treaty having been violat- 
ed in numerous instances, therefore the whole 
treaty is void, (p. 307-8). 
2 h . The relation which is to subsist between the 
nine or more ratifying States and those not 
ratifying. While no political relations would 
subsist, the moral relations would be the same, 
(p. 308). 



dawson's foederalist. 117 



118 dawson's foederalist. 

5 f . Fifth Class of Powers : Certain restrictions on 
the States ; w. c. 

(1). The absolute restrictions. (2). The qualified 
restrictions. 
l g . The absolute restrictions on the States. 

( 1 ) . The several absolute restrictions ; ( 2 ) . their 
nature. 

1\ The several absolute restrictions on the States. 
w. c. 
l j . " No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance 

" or confederation." (p. 308). 
2 J . ' 'Grant letters of marque and reprisal." 
3 j . "Coin money." 
4>. "Emit bills of credit." 
5 J . " Make anything but gold and silver, or legal 

"tender in payment of debts; " 
6 J . " Pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto 
"law or laws impairing the obligation of con- 
tracts. " 
7 j . "Grant any title of nobility." 
2 b . The nature and objects of these several abso- 
lute restrictions on the States. 
These "absolute restrictions" are such that they 
cannot be removed, even by the "consent of the 
Congress." 

l j . The nature and objects of the First Absolute 
restriction: "No State shall enter into any 
treaty, alliance or Confederation." 
This restriction prevails under the Articles, and, 
for reasons which are very apparent, were copied 
in the Constitution, (p. 309). 
2 J . The Nature and Objects of the several Abso- 
lute Restrictions : ' ' No State shall grant letters 
"of Marque and Reprisal." 
This power naturally belongs to the Govern- 
ment, from the necessity of uniformity. 
3 j . The Nature and Objects of the Third Absolute 
Restriction : * ' No State shall coin money. ' ' 
This power was taken from the States to pre- 



dawson's foederalist. 119 



120 dawson's foederalist. 

vent the multiplying of expensive mints and the 
diversity in form and weight of coins, (p. 309). 

4 J . The Nature and objects of the Fourth Abso- 
lute Restriction: "No State shall emit bills of 
"credit." 

l k . The Nature of a Bill of Credit. 

It is a written evidence of debt, issued by a 
State, on the credit of the State and payable 
at a future day. 
2\ The Objects of this Restriction. 

See Foed., p. 310. 

5 1 . The Nature and Objects of the Fifth Absolute 
Restriction: " No State shall make anything 
"but gold and silver a legal tender in the pay- 
ment of debts." 
See Foed., p. 310. 
6 j . Nature and Objects of the Sixth Absolute Re- 
striction: No State shall pass any bill of at- 
tainder, ex post facto laws or laws impairing 
"the obligation of contracts." 
Such laws are contrary to the first principles 
of the social compact, and to every principle of 
sound legislation, (pp. 310, 311.) 
7 j . Nature and Objects of the Seventh Restric- 
tion: "No State shall grant any titles of no- 
bility." 

This restriction needs no comment. 
2 g . The qualified restrictions on the States : (two 
in number) ; w. c. 

1\ "No State shall, without the consent of Con- 
"gress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or 
"exports, except what may be absolutely neces- 
"sary for executing its inspection laws, and the 
"net produce of all duties and imposts laid by 
"any State on imports or exports shall be for 
' ' the use of the Treasury of the United States, and 
"all such laws shall be subject to the revision 
" and control of Congress." 
This follows from the necessity of submitting 



dawson's foederalist. 121 



122 dawson's foederalist. 

the regulation of trade to the Government, (p. 
312). 

2 h . "No State shall, without the consent of Con- 
gress, lay any duty on tonnage." 

3 h . "Keep troops or ships of war in time of 
peace." 

4\ "Enter into any agreement or compact with 
another State or with a foreign power. 

5 h . "Or engage in war unless actually invaded 
"or in such imminent peril as will not admit 
"of delay." 

6 f . Sixth Class of Powers : Powers by which efficacy 
is given to all the rest. 

I s . Power to " make all laws which shall be neces- 
"sary and proper for carrying into execution the 
"foregoing powers, and all other powers vested 
"by this Constitution in the Government of the 
"United States"— w. c. (p. 312). 
(1). The necessity of such a power. (2). The 

several forms of expressing it— w. c. 

l h . The Necessity of Such a Power. 

The substance of such a power is absolutely 
necessary ; hence there can be objection only to its 
form. 

2\ The several other forms of expressing this 
power. 

(1). By prohibiting the exercise of all powers 
not expressly delegated. (2). By attempting a 
positive enumeration of the powers contemplated 
under the terms "necessary and proper." (3). 
By attempting a negative enumeration of them. 
(4). By remaining silent and leaving these neces- 
sary and proper powers to construction and in- 
ference, (p. 313). 

l j . By prohibiting the exercise of all powers not 
expressly delegated. 

This would either disarm the Government of all 
real power or lead to a disregard of this express 
restriction, (p. 313). 



dawson's foederalist. 123 



124 dawson's foederalist. 

2 J . By attempting a positive enumeration of those 
"necessary and proper powers." 
This would have involved a complete digest of 
laws on every subject to w r hich the Constitution 
relates, and would have to be accommodated to 
future changes, (p. 313). 

3 J . By attempting a negative enumeration of the 
powers not " necessary or proper." 
An equally chimerical task with the second (2 J ), 
and in effect it would have been a positive grant 
to the Government of all the powers not prohib- 
ited, (p. 314). 

4*. By being silent altogether and leaving these 
"necessary and proper powers" to inference 
and construction. 

All the particular powers necessary to carry 
out the general powers would, by necessary im- 
plication, have resulted to the Government, and 
the form used was to remove any pretext to 
question the essential powers of the Union, 
(p. 314). 
2 s . The power declaring that, "This Constitution 
"and the laws of the United States, which shall 
"be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties 
"made, or which shall be made, under the author- 
ity of the United States, shall be the supreme 
"law of the land, and the judges in every State 
"shall be bound thereby, anything in the laws of 
"any State to the contrary notwithstanding." 
Necessity of such a power. 

l h . The want of this power would have annulled 
all powers in the Constitution which exceeded 
those enumerated in the Articles of Confedera- 
tion, (p. 316). 

2\ The Constitutions of some States do not ad- 
mit expressly and fully the existing powers of the 
Confederacy, and an express saving of the former 
would, in such States, have brought into ques- 
tion every power of the Constitution. 

3\ The Constitutions of the States differ, and 



dawson's foederalist. 125 



126 dawson's foederalist. 

hence a treaty, etc., would be valid in some States 
and not in others, (p. 316). 

4\ The Supremacy of the State Constitutions, 
therefore, would have the head of the Govern- 
ment ruled and not ruling its members. 

3 s . The Power declaring that " The Senators and 
Representatives and members of the several State 
Legislatures and all Executive and Judicial offi- 
cers, both of the United States and the several 
States shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation to 
support this Constitution;" Necessity for Such 
a Power, (p. 317). 

4 g . The Powers belonging to the Executive and 

Judiciary Departments. 

See Foed. pp. 317 ; 467 and seq. ; 538 and seq. 
2 e . The mass of powers transferred to the Foederal 
Government will not be dangerous to the reserved 
authority of the States. 

l f . Because of the tendencies in Confederacies to de- 
spoil the Government of its delegated powers. 
2 f . Because the State Governments are constituent 

and essential elements of the Foederal Government. 
3 f . Because the employes of the United States will 

be fewer than those of the States. 
4 f . Because the powers reserved by the States are 

relatively greater and more numerous than those 

of the Union. 
5 f . Because the Constitution is the result less of 

new powers in the Union than of an invigoration 

of the old. 
6 f . Because the State Governments will possess more 

influence among the people, (p. 325). 
(1). From the greater number of officers. 
(2). From the character of the interests they pro- 
vide for. (p. 326). 

(3). From the greater familiarity of the people 
with them. 

(4). Illustrated from their history during the Rev- 
olution. 



dawson's foederalist. 127 



128 dawson's foederalist. 

7 f . Because the pre-possessions of the Government 
officers will be in favor of their States, (p. 327). 
8 f . Because the States possess the means of defeat- 
ing Foederal encroachments. 

(1). The means of encroachment possessed by the 
Foederal Government. (2). Those possessed by 
States. 

l g . The means of encroachment possessed by the 
Foederal Government. 

A standing army cannot exceed one-twenty-fifth 
of the population able to bear arms ; and hence, in 
the United States such an army could not (in 1781) 
exceed 30,000 men, or one-one-hundredth part of 
the whole number of people, (p. 331). 
2 s . The Means of Resistance to Foederal Encroach- 
ments Possessed by the State Governments. 
Twenty-four-twenty-fifths of the arms-bearing 
population, or 500,000 men, to withstand 30,000. 
p. 331). 
2 d . The particular structure of the Government, and 
the distribution of power among its several branches 
— w. c. 

(1). The particular structure of the Government. 
(2). The distribution of power among its several 
branches. 

l e . The particular structure of the Government — 
w. c. 

(1). The maxim on which the Government is 
founded. (2). The meaning of this maxim. (3). 
The means hereby to keep these three departments 
separate and distinct — w. c. 

l f . The maxim on which the Government is founded. 
"The Legislative, Executive and Judiciary Depart- 
"ments should be kept separate and distinct." (p. 
334). 

2 f . The meaning of this maxim that, "The Legisla- 
tive, Executive and Judiciary Departments should 
be separate and distinct." 

(1). The views of Montesquieu. (2). The pro- 
visions of the State Constitutions relative thereto 
— w. c. 



dawson's foederalist. 129 



130 



l g . The views of Montesquieu relative to this 

maxim. 

(1). As shown from the British Government, as 
his standard on this subject. (2). As shown from 
his expressed reasons. 

l h . The views of Montesquieu, relative to this 
maxim, as shown from the British Constitution, 
his standard on this subject, (p. 334). 

l j . The King forms an integral Part of the Legis- 
lative authority, (p. 335). 

2 j . The House of Lords is the Sole Depositary of 
Judiciary Power in cases of Impeachment, and 
is the Supreme Appellate Tribunal, (p. 333). 
3 j . The judges attend and participate in the 

Legislative deliberations. 
2\ The views of Montesquieu as shown by the 
reasons given by him for this maxim, (pp. 336, 
337). 

l j . "When the Legislative and Executive powers 
"are vested in the same person or body, there 
"can be no liberty because the same monarch or 
" Senate may enact tyrannical laws to execute 
"them in a tyrannical manner." 
2 j . " Were the Judiciary and Legislative powers 
"united, the life and liberty of the subject would 
"be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge 
"would then be the legislator." 
3 j . "Were the Executive and Judiciary powers 
"united, the j udge might behave with all the 
"violence of the oppressor" (p. 337). 
2 g . The meaning of this maxim, as shown by pro- 
visions in the State Constitutions relative thereto. 
(1). The particular provisions of the several 
State Constitutions relative thereto. (2). A gen- 
eral view of the State Constitutions relative to this 
maxim — w. c. 

l h . The particular provisions of the State Con- 
stitutions relative thereto. 
For a discussion of the Constitutions of New 



dawson's foederalist. 131 



132 dawson's foederalist. 

Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New Jer- 
sey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, see 
Foed. pp. 337, 342. 

2\ A general view of the State Constitutions rel- 
ative to this maxim, (p. 342). 
1 J . In some instances this maxim has been vio- 
lated, and in no instance has a proper method 
of maintaining it been devised. 
2 J . The proposed Constitution does not violate 
this maxim in its true meaning, nor in the mean- 
ing heretofore given to it in America, (p. 342). 
3 f . The means whereby to keep the Legislative, Ex- 
ecutive and Judiciary Departments separate and 
distinct — w. c. 

(1). The insufficiency of mere parchment barriers 
to attain this object. (-2). The insufficiency of Mr. 
Jefferson's proposition, "that whenever any two of 
"the three branches of Government shall concur in 
"opinion, each by the voice of two-thirds of their 
"whole number, that a convention is necessary for 
"altering the Constitution, or correcting breaches 
"of it, a convention shall be called for the purpose." 
(3). The insufficiency of periodical appeals to the 
people. (4). The proper expedient for keeping these 
three Departments separate and distinct — w. c. (p. 
343). 

I s . The insufficiency of mere parchment barriers 
for keeping these three Departments distinct. 
(1). Because of the tendency of the Executive 
Department, in hereditary monarchies, to usurpa- 
tion. (2). Because of the tendency of the Legisla- 
ture, in a representative republic as the United 
States, to usurpation — w. c. 
l h . Because of the Tendency of Hereditary Mon- 
archies to Usurpation, (p. 344). 
2\ Because of the Tendency of the Legislature, 
in a Representative Republic as the United States, 
to Usurpation. 
(1). The causes of this tendency. 



133 



134 dawson's foederalist. 

(2). This tendency illustrated from the history 
of Virginia and Pennsylvania. 

1 J . The Causes of this Tendency in the Legisla- 
ture in, a Representative Republic, to Usurpa- 
tion. 

1\ The Executive Department being limited in 
extent and duration of power, there is no dan- 
ger in the United States from that quarter. 
The Legislature must be jealously guarded be- 
cause of its supposed influence over the people 
and from the weight of its numbers, (p. 344). 

2 k . Its Constitutional Powers are more exten- 
sive and less susceptible of precise limits; it can 
with greater facility, mask, under complicated 
and indirect measures, the encroachments 
which it makes on the co-ordinate departments. 
It is often a question of real nicety in Legisla- 
tive bodies, whether the operation of a particu- 
lar power will or will not extend beyond the 
Legislative sphere. 
(See Foed. p. 345; Cooky's Const. Lim., (6th 

ed.) chap. v. p. 102; 10 Wheat., 46; 11 Pa. 

State Rep., 494). 

3\ The Legislative Department alone has access 
to the pockets of the people. 

2 J . The Tendency of the Legislature to Usurpa- 
tion illustrated from Virginia and Pennsylvania. 

l k . From the History of Virginia. 

Mr. Jefferson in his " Notes on the State of 
Virginia," p. 195, says: "All the powers of 
Government — Legislative, Executive and Judi- 
cial — result to the Legislative body." (p. 346). 

2 k . From the History of Pennsylvania. 

The council of censors of 1783 and 1784, who 
were appointed to decide in what instances the 
Legislative and Executive Departments had 
abused or neglected their powers, reported the 
following Legislative and Executive violations 
of the Constitution of Pennsylvania. 



dawson's foederalist. 135 



136 dawson's foederalist. 

I 1 . Legislative Violations of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution. 

l m . A great number of laws were passed with- 
out first being printed for the consideration 
of the people. 

2 m . The Constitutional trial by jury had been 

violated. 
3 m . Executive powers had been usurped. 

4 m . The salaries of the Judges had been 
changed and their powers often assumed. 

2 h . Executive Violations of the Pennsylvania Con- 
stitution. 

This Department had been guilty of frequent 
violations of the Constitution, but under the fol- 
lowing circumstances : 
(1). From the necessities of war. : 
(2). In compliance with the declared or known 
sentiments of the Legislature. 

(3). From the evils of the plural executive, con- 
sisting of about twenty members— resembling a 
Legislature in this respect more than an Executive 
Department. 

2 g . The insufficiency (for keeping these three depart- 
ments separate and distinct) of Mr. Jefferson's 
proposition of occasional appeals: "that when- 
ever any two of the three branches of Govern- 
* ' ment shall concur in the opinion, each by the voice 
"of two-thirds of its members, that a convention 
"is necessary for altering the Constitution or cor- 
"recting breaches of it, a convention shall be 
"called for the purpose." (p. 349). 
1\ This provision does not reach the case of a 
combination of two of the departments against 
the rest. (p. 350). 
2\ These appeals, implying as they do some de- 
fect in the Government, deprive the Government 
of that veneration which is necessary to stability, 
(p. 351). 
3 h . The danger of disturbing the public tranquil- 



dawson's foederalist. 137 



138 



ity by interesting too strongly the public pas- 
sions, (p. 351). 
4\ The decision resulting from such appeals would 
not preserve this desired equilibrium (p. 352). 

1\ The tendency of the Legislature to encroach 
would render most frequent the appeals by the 
Executive and Judiciary Departments. The 
jealousy of the people of the former, their small 
number,the mode of the appointment of the judi- 
ciary, their removal from the people, the much 
greater number composing the Legislature, 
their personal association among the people, 
all tend to taint the decision of the people 
with partiality for the Legislature, (p. 353). 

2\ The Legislative party would probably be 
members of that convention and be their own 
judges, (pp. 353-4). 

3 s . The insufficiency of periodical appeals for keep- 
ing the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary De- 
partments separate and distinct. 

1\ When the periods are of short intervals. 

The measures to be reviewed will be recent, and 
the circumstances that gave birth to them will 
still wield a potent influence, (p. 353). 

2\ When the periods are of long intervals. 

l j . In respect of recent measures, the objections 

under (1\) would apply. 
2 j . A distant prospect of censure exercises very 

little restraint on present excesses, (p. 355). 

3 j . The remedy would often come too late for the 

disease. 
4 j . Evils of long standing might take deep root 
and not be easily extirpated. 
4 g . The proper expedients for keeping these three 
Departments separate and distinct. 
By giving to each department a will of its own 
and hence : 
1\ The members of each department should have 



139 



140 dawson's foederalist. 

as little agency as possible in the appointment 

of the others, (p. 359). 

In the case of the Judiciary Department this 
principal cannot be strictly adhered to for two 
reasons : 

(1). Their peculiar requirements demand that 
mode of choice best suited to obtaining persons 
of those requirements. (2). Their necessarily long 
duration in office destroys all dependence on the 
appointing power, (p. 359). 

2\ The members of each department should be as 
little dependent as possible on the others for their 
emoluments. 

3 h . The members of each department should pos- 
sess the necessary constitutional means and per- 
sonal motives to resist encroachments, (p. 360). 

4\ The encroaching spirit of Republican Legisla- 
tures should be further guarded against. 

l j . By dividing the Legislature into two branches, 
e. g., a Senate and House of Representatives. 

2 j . By rendering them as little connected with 
each other as the good of the society will admit. 
l k . Through different modes of election, (p. 

361). 
2\ Through different principles of action. 

3 j . By giving to the Executive a qualified veto 
and a qualified connection with the Senate as a 
substitute for an absolute veto, which on ordi- 
nary occasions might not be used with sufficient 
firmness, and which on extraordinary occasions 
might be abused, (p. 361). 
5 h . Through an extension of the Foederal system 

of America. 

l j . In the compound Republic of the United States 
the power surrendered by the people is divided 
between two Governments — the State and Foed- 
eral — and each of these two portions is divided 
into three parts, thus providing a security double 
that provided in a single Republic, (p. 362). 



dawson's foederalist. 141 



142 



2 j . This Foederal system, by comprehending in 
the society so many separate descriptions of 
citizens, will render an unjust combination of a 
majority improbable if not impracticable, (pp. 
62, 362-3). 
2 e . The distribution— by the Constitution — of power 
among the three departments— the Legislature, the 
Executive and the Judiciary. 
1*. The Legislature— w. c. 

(1). The House of Representatives. (2). TheSen- 
ate. 
l g . The House of Representatives— w. c. 

(1). The qualifications of the Representatives. 
(2). The qualifications of the electors of the Repre- 
sentatives. (3). The term of office of the Repre- 
sentatives. (4). The apportionment of the Repre- 
sentatives to the several States. (5). The number 
of which the House of Representatives is to con- 
sist. (6). The authority of Congress to regulate, 
in the last resort, the election of the House of Rep- 
resentatives, (p. 363). 
l h . The qualifications of the Representatives. 
l j . They must be twenty -five years old when they 
enter on their duties, not necessarily when 
elected. 
2 j . They must have been seven years citizens of 
the United States. 

This restriction applies only to naturalized cit- 
izens and not to inhabitants of territory acquired 
by the United States by purchase — e. g., Florida 
and California — for they became citizens at the 
moment of the purchase. 

3 j . They must at the time of their election be in- 
habitants of the State they are to represent. 
4 3 . They must, during their time of service, hold 

no office under the United States. 
2*. The qualifications of the electors of the Repre- 
sentatives, (pp. 365—6). 

(1). The qualifications prescribed by the Con- 
stitution. (2). The necessity for prescribing them 



dawson's foederalist. 143 



144 



in the Constitution. (3). The advantages of the 
Constitutional provision, (p. 365). 
1 J . The qualifications prescribed by the Constitu- 
tion. 

The same as those of electors of the most nu- 
merous branch of the State Legislatures; e. g., 
any person entitled by the Constitution of Vir- 
ginia to vote for a member of the lower House 
of the Virginia Legislature is entitled to the 
United States Constitution to vote for a member 
of the United States House of Representatives. 
2 J . The necessity for prescribing these qualifica- 
tions in the United States Constitution. 
The definition of the right of suffrage is justly 
regarded as "a fundamental article by Republi- 
can Government;" hence it was incumbent on 
the Convention to define and establish this right 
in the Constitution. 

l k . To have left the matter open for the occa- 
sional regulation of Congress would have vio- 
lated that " fundamental article." 
2\ To have submitted it to the Legislative dis- 
cretion of the States would have given rise to 
two objections : 

(1) The violation of the " fundamental arti- 
cle." 

(2) The rendering of the House of Represen- 
tatives dependent on the State Governments, 
(p. 365). 

3\ To have made the qualifications uniform 
would have been (1) dissatisfactory to some 
States; (2) difficult for the convention, (p. 
365). 
3 j . The Advantages of the Qualifications Pre- 
scribed by the Constitution, (p. 366). 
1\ It must be satisfactory to every State. 
2\ It will be safe to the United States. 

Being fixed by the State Constitutions and not 
subject to the Legislatures. 
3\ The term of office of Representatives. 



dawson's foederalist. 145 



146 



(1). The length of their term. (2). Will bien- 
nial elections of the Representatives be safe ? (3) . 
Will they be necessary or useful ? 
l j . The length of the term of office of Represen- 
tatives. 
Two years. 
2 J . Will the biennial election of the Representa- 
tives be safe ? 

(1). Affirmatively shown from history. 
(2). Reply to the objection that, ' ' Where annual 
elections cease tyranny begins." 
l k . Affirmatively shown from History that 
Biennial Elections in the United States will 
prove safe. (p. 366). 

It is essential to liberty that the Government 
in general should have a common interest with 
the people, and especially essential that the 
House of Representatives should have an im- 
mediate dependence on and sympathy with the 
the people — an end only to be accomplished 
through frequent elections. But the degree of 
frequency required is difficult of determination. 
I 1 . From the History of the House of Com- 
mons in England. 

Originally the times of election of the com- 
mons was within the discretion of the King. 

In the reign of Charles II. a statute made 
the period three years, (p. 368). 

In the reign of William III. the same period 
was adopted. In 1787 the period was seven 
years. If, under triennial, and even under sep- 
tennial elections, the English people have, under 
the unlimited Legislative authority of the 
House of Lords and the House of Commons, 
preserved a considerable degree of liberty, much 
more ought the people of the United States to 
be safe with a House of Representatives, lim- 
ited in authority and elected every two years. 
2 l . From the History of Ireland. 
Originally members of Parliament in Ireland 



dawson's foederalist. 147 



148 



were elected seldom, as on the ascension of a 
king. 

The Parliament beginning in the reign of 
George III. continued thirty-five years. 

In 1787 they were elected every five years. (In 
1801 the Irish Parliament was abolished). The 
conclusion is, that if the Irish have preserved 
any liberty under their system, much more 
ought we under ours. (p. 369). 
3 1 . From the History of the Colonies. 

E. g., Virginia elected her Representatives for 
seven years and was the first to resist the Par- 
liamentary usurpations of England and the 
first to espouse the Declaration of Independence, 
(p. 371). 

2 k . Reply to the objection that, " Where annual 
Elections end Tyranny Begins ". 
I 1 . There is No Reason for the Objection. 

For there is no connection between the sun, 
or the seasons, and the time that virtue can 
withstand temptation. 
2 l . It was not advocated by the States. 

In Connecticut and Rhode Island the period 
is six months, in South Carolina, two years 
and in the other States one year. The ratio 
between the extreme periods is as 1 to 4 ; yet, 
does that represent the ratio of liberty enjoyed 
by the people of Rhode Island and South Caro- 
lina respectively ? (p. 372 ) . 
3 1 . The Ground of This Objection is Inappli- 
cable to the United States; 

It is borrowed from England, where no bet- 
ter security could be desired than an appeal 
to some simple and familiar period of time to 
measure the danger of innovations, to fix the 
national sentiment and unite patriotic exer- 
tions as barriers against a Legislature, that in 
England can change even the fundamental 
Constitution itself. Biennial elections will 
prove a greater security in the United States 



dawson's foederalist. 149 



150 dawson's foederalist. 

under a Limited Constitution, unchangeable 

by the Legislature, than even a less period in 

England under their present system, (p. 373). 

3 J . The Necessity of Biennial Elections of the 

House of Representatives. 

1\ To give the members time to acquire a prac- 
tical knowledge of their duties — e. g. 
I 1 . The local laws and situations of the sev- 
eral States. 

l m . For the regulation of foreign trade. 
2 m . Of inter-state trade and taxes. 
3 m . And of the militia. 
2 1 . The regulation of foreign affairs. 
2\ This period is a greater inducement than one 
year to competent men to leave home and take 
the position, (p. 376). 
3 k . To prevent too great an accumulation of in- 
experienced men. 
4\ To give sufficient time for investigating 
spurious elections. 
4\ The apportionment of Representatives to the 
several States. 

(1). The mode of apportionment. (2). The rep- 
resentation of slaves, and reasons therefor. 

l j . The mode of apportionment of Representa- 
tives to the several States. 
Representatives are to be apportioned in the 
several States in the same manner as direct 
taxes, according to the population of each State. 

2 J . The representation of slaves and reasons 

. therefore. 
1\ The Representation of Slaves. 

In determining the number of Representatives 
which each State is to have in Congress five 
negroes are to be counted as three white persons 
— i. e., one negro is equal to three-fifths of a 
white person, (p. 378). 
2\ Reasons for the Representation of slaves. 



dawson's foederalist. 151 



152 dawson's foederalist. 

1\ Slaves are Persons as well as Property. 

l m . The respects in which they are regarded as 
property, (p. 379). 
l n . They are bought and sold. 

2 n . They are compelled to labor for their mas- 
ters. 

3 n . They are restrained in their liberty and 
chastised in their body according to their 
masters' caprices. 
2 m . The respects in which they are regarded 

as persons. 

l n . They are protected in their life and limb 
against the violence of others. 

2 n . They are punishable for violence to others. 

(p. 380). 

2 1 . It would not have been just to have counted 

the slaves when taxes were to be imposed 

and to have excluded them when the number 

of Representatives was to be calculated, (p. 

380). 

3 1 . Reply to the Objection that " Slaves are not 

included in the estimate of Representatives in 

any of the States possessing them." 

It is a fundamental principle of the proposed 

Constitution that, as the aggregate number of 

Representatives allotted to the several States 

is to be determined by a Foederal rule, founded 

on the aggregate number of inhabitants, so 

the right of choosing this allotted number in 

each State is to be exercised in such manner as 

the State itself may designate. In all the States 

a certain portion of the inhabitants is not 

counted. 

E. g., In Virginia none but freeholders can 
vote; Massachusetts requires an educational 
qualification, (p. 381). 

3 1 . Representation relates to property as well 

as to persons, (p. 382.) 
5 1 . The votes allowed in the Foderal Legisla- 



dawson's foederalist. 153 



154 



ture to the people of each State ought to bear 
some proportion to the comparative wealth 
of the States for another reason: States have 
not, like individuals, an influence over each 
other, arising from superior advantages of 
fortune, (p. 382). 
6 1 . This system will tend to the accuracy of the 
census, (p. 384). 
5\ The number o£ which the House of Represen- 
tatives is to consist, and the objections thereto 
considered. 

l j . The number of which the House is to consist. 
On the ratio of seven Representatives to 30,000 
people, the first House of Representatives will 
consist of sixty-five members. After the first cen- 
sus it will probably consist of about 100 mem- 
bers. (It did in fact consist of 105 members in 
1793. W. A. F.) 

2 j . Objections to the number of which the House 
of Representatives is to consist, answered. 
(1). "That so small a number of Representa- 
tives will be an unsafe depositary of the public 
interests." (2). "That they will not possess a 
proper knowledge of the local circumstances of 
their numerous constituents." (3). "That they 
will be taken from that class of citizens which 
will sympathize least with the mass of the peo- 
ple and be most likely to aim at the elevation of 
a few." (4). "That the number of which the 
House of Representatives is to consist will be- 
come more and more disproportionate from the 
lack of a correspondent increase in the number 
of Representatives." 

1\ First Objection, that "the number of which 
the House of Representatives is to consist will 
be an unsafe depositary of the public interests" 
— answered. 

(1). The difficulties of determining the proper 
number. (2). General rules to be observed in 
determining this number. (3). The securities 
against encroachments by the number proposed. 



dawson's foederalist. 155 



156 DAWSON 'S FOEDERAUST. 

I 1 . The Difficulties of Determining the Proper 
Number. 

These are best shown by an examination of 
the several State Legislatures. 

(1). The number of Representatives in Dela- 
ware is two. 

()2. The number of Representatives in Mas- 
sachusetts is about three hundred and fifty. 

(3). The number of Representatives in Penn- 
sylvania is about seventy. The ratio of rep- 
resentation is not the same in any two States. 

The ratio of Representation in Pennsylvania 
is one Representative to about 4,000 people ; 
in Rhode Island, one Representative to about 
1,000. 

2\ General rules to be observed in determining 
the number of Representatives. 
First. The number must be so large as to se- 
cure the benefits of free consultation and dis- 
cussion and to guard against too easy a com- 
bination for improper purposes. 

Second. The number ought to be sufficiently 
small to guard against the confusion and in- 
temperance of a multitude, (p. 386). 

3 1 . The securities against encroachments by the 
number proposed. 

(1). The actual number composing the House 
of Representatives. 

( 2 ) . The securities . 
l m . The actual number composing the House 
of Representatives. 
l n . The number of Representatives in 1787 

Sixty-five. 
2*. The actual Number in 1793. 

The number then was one hundred and five > 
showing that the estimate of the Foederalist 
of 100 was safe. 
3 n . The actual number in 1894. 



FOEDERALIST. 157 



158 



Three hundred and sixty-five Representa- 
tives and four from Territories. 

2 m . The securities against such encroachments, 
(p. 388). 

1*. The genius of the people, (p. 388). 
E. g., Their scorn of the foreign gold. 

2 H . The lack of means of corruption by the 
other branches of the Foederal Go vernment. 
(p. 390). 

2 k . Second objection to the constitution of the 
House of Representatives, that " the number of 
Representatives will be too small to possess a 
proper knowledge of the local circumstances of 
their various constituencies, " answered. 
(1). The source of this objection. 
(2). The objects of Foederal legislation. 
(3). Comparison drawn between the House of 
Commons and the House of Representatives, 
and conclusions thereon. 

I 1 . The source of this objection. 

In forgetting that the knowledge of the Foed- 
eral Representatives will extend only to general 
subjects of legislation, as commerce and taxa- 
tion, and need not extend to a knowledge of mi- 
nute local details, (p. 291). 

2 1 . The objects of Foederal legislation. 
l m . Commerce. 
Foed., p. 392. 

2 m . Taxation. 

Foed., p. 392. 
3 m . The Militia. 
Foed., p. 393. 
3 1 . Comparison drawn between the House of 
Commons and the House of Representatives 
as to numbers, and conclusions thereon. 

1"\ Comparison drawn between the House of 
Commons and the House of Representatives 
as to numbers. 



dawson's foederalist. 159 



160 



l n . Ratio of representation in the House of 

Commons. 

The total number is 558. Of these, 62 are 
elected by 364 people, 279 are elected by 
5,723 people and 217 are elected by all the 
people. 

Hence, we may say that the 8,000,000 peo- 
ple (in 1787) of England and Scotland had, 
say, 279 (one-half of 558) representatives, or 
1 to every 28,674? people. 

2 n . Ratio of representation in the House of 
Representatives. 

In 1787, 1 to 30,000; (in 1894, 1 to 156,- 
000.) 

2 m . Conclusions from this comparison. 

That, if one Representative to every 28,000 
has been able to preserve the liberties of the 
people and have a proper knowledge of local 
affairs in England under a monarchy and 
with an unlimited Legislature, a fortiori 
ought 30,000 to do so in the United States in 
a Republic with a limited government? (p. 
396). 

3\ Third objection to the Constitution of the 
House of Representatives, that "it will be 
taken from that class of citizens which have 
least sympathy with the mass of the people and 
will be most likely to aim at the elevation of the 
few, " answered. 

(1). Certain considerations that will tend to 
secure the fidelity of the Representatives to their 
constituents. (2). This objection is inadmissible 
in its consequences ; it is unreasonable and un- 
warranted by history. 

I 1 . Certain considerations that will tend to se- 
cure the fidelity of the Representatives to their 
constituents. 

l m . The electors are to be the great body of the 
people of the United States, and are deter- 
mined by the States themselves. 



dawson's foederalist. 161 



162 dawson's foederalist. 

2 m . Every man whose merit commends him to 
the esteem and confidence of the people may 
be a Representative. 

3 m . The situation of the men securing the peo- 
ple's suffrages involves every security for 
their fidelity that can be desired, (p. 398). 

l n . The Representatives, having received the 
suffrages of the people, must have had such 
qualities as commended them to the people 
for integrity and fidelity. 

2 n . The Representatives will enter into office 
with a feeling of love and gratitude to their 
constituents and a desire to retain their 
good opinions. 

3*. Those Representatives elevated by the 
people will feel .no desire to make any dim- 
inution in the rights and privileges of the 
power that elevated them. (p. 398). 

4 n . Biennial elections, which keep the Repre- 
sentatives continually in mind of their de- 
pendence on the people. 

5*. The Representatives can make no laws, 
oppressive or not, that will not operate 
equally on themselves as on others. 

2 l . This objection is inadmissible in its conse- 
quences ; it is unreasonable and unwarranted 
by history. 

l m . It is Inadmissible in its Consequences. 

It strikes at the root of the Republican Gov- 
ernment, and if it proved anything, would prove 
that the people are incapable of choosing their 
Representatives, (p. 401). 

2 m . It is Unreasonable. 

Because a better Representative should be 
elected by 5,000 say, than 500, the field of se- 
lection being larger and more difficult to cor- 
rupt. 
3 m . It is Unwarranted by History. 



DAWSON'S FOEDERALIST. 163 



184 



l n . As shown by the History of the House of 
Commons. 

The electors of the House of Commons are 
restricted to freeholders of estates of one hun- 
dred pounds or more per year, yet there the 
Representatives have not elevated the few at 
the expense of the many. 

2 n . As shown from the History of the Amer- 
ican Colonies. 

E. g., Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and 
others, (p. 402). 

4 k . Fourth objection to the Constitution of the 
House of Representatives, that "the number 
of which the House of Representatives is to 
consist will become more and more dispropor- 
tionate from a lack of a correspondent increase 
in the number of Representatives," answered. 

I 1 . The provision of the United States Consti- 
tution on this subject will not suffer by con- 
parison with State Constitutions. 
The number of Representatives in the first 
Congress was to last but three years, when a 
census was to be held then, and every succeed- 
ing ten years, for the purpose of regulating the 
number of Representatives ; no such State pro- 
vision exists, (p. 404). 

2 1 . In the States, even under their defective 
systems, the increase in Representatives has 
kept pace with the increase in population. 
2 1 . The peculiar constitution of the Senate and 
House of Representatives will conduce to an 
augmentation of the number of Representa- 
tives. 

In the Senate the States are represented and 
the smaller States have the advantage ; in the 
House the citizens are represented and the 
larger States have greater weight and would 
be most strenuous in their efforts to increase 
the number of Representatives. 
The fact that the Senate must pass on any bill 



dawson's foederalist. 165 



166 DAWSON 'S FOEDERALIST. 

for an increase of Representatives would not 
defeat it for several reasons : 

First. The House, being larger and speaking 
the will of the people and of the larger States 
and having justice on their side, will have great 
moral influence over the Senate. 

Second. The medium States, under these cir- 
cumstances, will probably join the juster and 
stronger States. 

Third. The new and growing States would 
favor reapportionment, (p. 406). 

Fourth. The House of Representatives holds 
the keys to the Treasury and hence may demand 
a reapportionment, (p. 407). 

3 j . Additional reasons for restricting the number 
of the first House of Representatives to sixty- 
five. 
l k . From reasons of economy. 

2 k . To secure a greater portion of fit Represen- 
tatives. 
3\ The larger representative assemblies are, the 
more they will partake of the infirmities of de- 
mocracies, (p. 409). 
6\ The authority of Congress to regulate, in the 
last resort, the election of the members of the 
House of Representatives. 

(1). The exact terms of this authority . (2). The 
general principle on which this authority rests. 
(3). The necessity of such an authority existing 
somewhere. (4). The different ways of modifying 
or disposing of this authority. 
l j . The exact terms of this authority. 

"The times, places and manner of holding elec- 
tions for Senators and Representatives shall be 
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; 
but the Congress may, at anytime bylaw, make 
or alter such regulations, except as to the places 
of choosing Senators." (p. 411). 
2 J . The general principle on which this authority 
rests. 



dawson's foederalist. 167 



168 dawson's foederalist. 

Every government ought to contain in itself 
the means of its own preservation. 
3 J . The necessity of such an authority existing 
somewhere. 

This discretionary power must have been placed 
somewhere, since an election law, which would 
have always been applicable to every probable 
change in the situation of the country, could not 
have been framed and inserted in the Constitu- 
tion, (p. 411). 

4 j . The different ways of modifying or disposing 
of this authority. 
l k . By lodging it wholly in Congress. 

This plan would have met with universal con- 
demnation. 

2 k . By lodging it wholly in the State Legisia- 
tures. 

(1). The chief danger of this plan. (2). An 
argument in favor of the plan answered. 
I 1 . The chief danger of this plan. 

The States could destroy the Government by 
neglecting to appoint persons to administer it. 
(p. 413). 

2 1 . An argument in favor of this plan, answered. 
l m . The argument stated. 

"The election of the United States Senators 
is entirely in the hands of the State Legisla- 
tures, and, by forebearing to elect Senators, 
they could destroy the Government ; having 
placed the existence of the Government in this 
case in the States, why not in the case of 
House of Representatives ? 
2 m . The argument answered. 
l n . The fact that the State Legislatures have 
the power, in the election of Senators, to de- 
stroy the Union is no reason why they 
should be given the additional power 
through the election of Representatives, 
(p. 413). 
This evil in the case of the Senate could not 



dawson's foederalist. 169 



170 dawson's foederalist. 

be avoided and yet give the Government a 
Foederal feature. 

2 m . More danger is to be apprehended in the 
case of the election of Representatives than 
of Senators. 

Only one-third of the Senators are elected 
every two years, and no State now elects both 
of its Senators at the same time, while all of 
the Representatives are elected every two 
years. Hence a combination of all the States 
electing Senators at one time would still leave 
at least two-thirds of the Senate and more 
than a quorum ; but a combination of a few 
States to prevent the election of the Represen- 
tatives would destroy this branch of Congress 
and annihilate the Government, (p. 414). 

3\ By lodging it primarily in the States and ul- 
timately in the Congress. 
(1). The safety of this plan. (2). Its advan- 
tages. 
I 1 . The safety of this plan. 

(1). As '"to promoting the election of some 
favorite class." (2). As to its lack of a pro- 
vision requiring, "that all elections shall be 
held in the counties where the electors reside." 

l m . As to "promoting the election of some 
favorite class." 
l n . Such an attempt would cause a revolt of 

the people. 
2 n . Such an attempt would be difficult of suc- 
cess from the dissimilar ingredients compos- 
ing the Government. 

(1). As to the House of Representatives. 
The diversity in the property, habits, genius 
and manners of the electors is a sufficient 
guarantee for a diversity of Representatives. 
(2). The United States Senate is to be selected 
by Legislatures chosen directly by the people. 
(3). The President will be the choice of elec- 
tors of the people. 



dawson's foederalist. 171 



172 dawson's foederalist. 

3*. The qualifications of electors are to be 
regulated by the States themselves. 

2 m . As to the lack of a provision requiring, 
"that all elections shall be held in the coun- 
ties where the electors reside." (p. 424). 

l n . Such a provision would have been harm- 
less. 
, 2 n . There are no such provisions in the State 
Constitutions. 

The New York Constitution examined, (p. 
424). 
2 1 . The advantages of the plan determined by 
the convention, (p. 411). 
(For a full and interesting discussion under 
6 h , see Gilmore's Notes, pp. 80 and seq.) 

To establish a uniform time of holding elec- 
tions for Representatives, should it ever become 
desirable. 
2 g . The Senate — w. c. 

(1) The qualifications of members; (2) the man- 
ner of their election ; (3) the manner of filling vacan- 
cies ; (4) the equality of representation in the Sen- 
ate ; (5) their number and the term for which they 
are elected ; (6) the powers vested in the Senate. 

l h . The Qualifications of Senators. 

l j . They must be thirty years of age. (p. 428). 

2 j . They must have been citizens nine years. 

These requirements are more extensive than 
those for the Representatives, because the Sena- 
torial trust requires greater extent of informa- 
tion and stability of character. 

2 h . The manner of their election. 

They are elected by the State Legislatures for 
two reasons : 

First. As favoring a more select appointment. 

Second. As a special acknowledgment of the 
Foederal element in the Government, this action 
of the several Legislatures being a State act and 
an act of sovereignty. 



173 



174 dawson's foederalist. 

3\ The Manner of Filling Vacancies in the Sen- 
ate. 

(See United States Constitution, Art. I., §3, 
clause 2 ; Gilmore's Notes, p. 71 ; Madison Papers, 
pp: 1228, 1269-70, 1543, as to why " resignation 
or otherwise" was used. It means by " resigna- 
tion or any other manner whatever.") 

(1). If the Legislature of the State having the 
vacancy is not in session the Governor appoints. 

(2). If the Legislature is in session the Legisla- 
ture of that State elects the successor. 

4 h . The Equality of Representation in the Senate. 

l j . The Cause of This Equality. 

It was the result of a compromise between the 
larger and the smaller States, and, but for such 
a provision, the smaller States would not have 
consented to enter the Union. 

2 j . The Effect of this Equality. 

l k/ It is a Constitutional recognition of the resid- 
uary sovereignty of the States, (p. 430). 

2 k . It will prove a check to improper legislation, 
(p. 430). 

5\ The Number of Senators and the Term for 
Which They Are Elected. 

l j . The Actual Number of Senators and Their 
Term of Office. 

(1). The Senators are two from each State ; 
hence, with the original thirteen States, the Sen- 
ate consisted of twenty-six Senators ; as it now 
(1894) consists of 88. (2). They are elected for 
six years, (p. 431). 
2 J . The objects to be attained by having a Senate. 

In order to thoroughly appreciate the compo- 
sition of the Senate, it will be necessary to exam- 
ine into the purposes of its establishment. We 
will consider the object of a Senate as, (1) sug- 
gested by reason ; (2) as illustrated by history. 

1\ The objects of a Senate as suggested by 
reason. 



dawson's foederalist. 175 



176 dawson's eoederalist. 

(1). As a check on the House of Representa- 
tives. (2). As a check on the people themselves. 
I 1 . As*a check on the House of Representatives. 
l m . By requiring the concurrence of two dis- 
tinct bodies in schemes of usurpation. 
2 m . From the propensitiy of all single and nu- 
merous assemblies to yield to the impulse of 
sudden and violent passions, the House of 
Representatives will require such a check as 
the Senate— a stable and small body. (p. 
432). 
3 m . By supplying the defect of the House of 
Representatives, in the want of a due ac- 
quaintance with the objects and principles of 
legislation, as a result of the short period 
for which the Representatives are elected. 
4 m . By preventing that mutability in the pub- 
lic councils, resulting from a rapid succession 
of new members, (p. 433 and seq.) 
5 m . By giving to the Government a due sense 
of National character, (p. 436). 
6 m . By supplying the defect of a want of a 
due responsibility in the Government to the 
people, arising from the frequency of elec- 
tions in the House, (p. 437 and seq.) 
2 1 . As a Check on the People Themselves. 

There may be times when the people, in- 
flamed by passion or misled by artful and in- 
terested men, will call for measures which 
they will soon lament. At such times the nec- 
essity for a temperate and respectable body 
like the Senate will be great and their influ- 
ence very salutary. 

2\ The Objects of a Senate as Illustrated by 
History. 

We have no record of a long-lived Republic 
without a Senate; e. g., Sparta, Rome and Car- 
thage, (p. 439 and seq.) 
6\ The Powers Vested in the Senate. 
(1) In the making of treaties ; (2) in the appoint- 



dawson's foederalist. 177 



178 



ing of public officers; (3) in the trying of impeach- 
ments, (p. 446). 

1 J . The powers vested in the Senate in the making 
of Treaties. 

(1). The exact terms of this power. (2). Rea- 
sons for associating the Senate in the making of 
treaties. (3). Objections thereto. 

1*. The Exact Terms of This Power. 

The President " shall have power, by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate, to make 
treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators 
present concur.' ' 

2\ Reasons for associating the Senate in the 
making of treaties. 

I 1 . Because the Senators will possess greater 
wisdom and experience. 

1*. From their maturer age ; they must be at 
least thirty years of age, the Representatives 
only twenty-five. 
2 m . From the manner of their selection. 

By the State Legislatures. 
2\ Because of the peculiar constitution of the 
Senate. 

l m . They are elected for six years. 
2 m . Only one-third of the Senators are elected 
every two years, leaving two-thirds of the 
Senate at least composed of experienced men. 
3\ Because, from their smaller number, they 
better permit of secrecy and dispatch than 
the House of Representatives. 
3\ Objections to associating the Senate in the 
making of treaties. 

I 1 . Because, "the treaties, having the force of 
laws, should be made only by men invested 
with legislative authority." (p. 450). 
The Executive and Judiciary Departments of 
the Government perform acts that are as bind- 
ing as those of the Legislature. 
2 1 . Because, "treaties so made would be mere 



dawson's foederalist. 179 



180 dawson's foederalist. 

acts of the Legislature, and therefore ought 
to be repealable at pleasure and not the su- 
preme law of the land." 

The fallacy is in assuming that they are 
"mere acts of the Legislature." Treaties are 
contracts, to establish which two parties must 
agree, and are binding till both agree to cancel 
or alter them. (p. 451). 

2 J . The powers vested in the Senate in the ap- 
pointing of public officers. 
See post. p. 469 and seq. 
3 J . The powers of the Senate in the trying of 
impeachments. 

(1). The exact terms of this power. (2). Rea- 
sons therefor. (3). Objections thereto. 

. l k The Exact Terms of This Power. 

"The Senate shall have the sole power to try 
all impeachments. When sitting for that pur- 
pose they shall be on oath or affirmation. When 
the President of the United States is tried the 
Chief Justice shall preside, and no person shall 
be convicted without the concurrence of two- 
thirds of the members present, (p. 454). 
2\ The Reasons Therefor. 

I 1 . Impeachment is a method of National in- 
quest into the conduct of public men, and 
most properly the Representatives of the Na- 
tion should be the inquisitors. 
The House of Representatives being allowed 
to prefer the charges, the other branch of the 
People's Representatives should be joined in 
the inquest. 

2 1 . Our plan of impeachment is modeled after 
that of England. There the House of Com- 
mons impeaches and the House of Lords tries. 
3 1 . The Senate will be superior, for this pur- 
pose, to the Supreme Court. 
l m . Because of its greater numbers. 
2 m . An officer after conviction, upon impeach- 
ment, is still subject to further indictment and 



FOEDERALIST. 181 



182 



punishment, and thus the Supreme Court, if 
they tried the impeachment, might be called 
in another trial to pass upon their former 
judgment, (p. 457). 

4 1 . The Senate alone will be superior, for this 
purpose, to a court consisting of the Senate 
and Supreme Judges. 

This plan would be subject to objection un- 
der (2 m ). (p. 457). 

3 1 . It would be superior to a Court of Impeach- 
ment established solely for that purpose. 
This scheme is utterly impracticable. 

3 k . Objections to constituting the Senate a Court 
of Impeachment. 

I 1 . That it confounds the Legislative and the 
Judiciary Authority. 
See Foed., p. 333/ 
2 1 . That it will cause such an accumulation of 
power in the Senate as to make the Govern- 
ment too aristocratic. 

l m . The House of Representatives, being the 

most popular branch of the Government, 

will be a full match for every other member 

of the Government. 

2 m . The House of Representatives originates 

money bills. 
3 m . The House of Representatives originates 

all impeachments. 
4 m . The House of Representatives will elect 
the President when the electors fail to choose. 
3 1 . That their agency in the appointment of 
officers will render the Senate too indulgent 
judges of their appointees. 
l m . This objection would condemn the prac- 
tice of all the State Governments, (p. 463). 
2 m . The Senators would feel no partiality to- 
ward their appointees, since the President 
chooses and they merely confirm. 
4'. That their agency in making treaties would 



dawson's foederalist. 183 



184 



disqualify them as a court, to try their cor- 
rupt execution of that trust. 
See Foed., p. 465; Story on Constitution, 
pp. 803-6. 

2*. The Executive — w. c. 

(1). The general character of the Executive. (2). 
The manner of his appointment. (3). The Consti- 
tutional provision for securing energy in the Exec- 
utive. 

I s . The general character of the Executive. 

(1). As represented by the opponents of the Con- 
stitution. (2). The true character of the Execu- 
tive. 

l h . The general character of the Executive as rep- 
resented by the opponents of the Constitution. 

l j . General Misrepresentations. 

1\ " The Executive is to be the full-grown prog- 
eny of monarchy.' ' 

2\ "He is to have royal prerogatives." 

2\ " To be crowned with a diadem and dress in 
regal purple.'' 
4 k . "He is to indulge in a harem." 
2 k . A Particular Instance of Misrepresentation. 
I 1 . The Misrepresentation Stated. 

The anti-Foederalists charge that the Con- 
stitution gives the President power to fill va- 
cancies in the Senate. 

( " Cato," nom deplume of George Clinton). 
2 1 . The Misrepresentation Answered. 
See U. S. Const., Art. II., §2, clauses 2 and 3. 
l m . The Second Clause gives the President 
Power to make such appointments as are 
not otherwise provided for in the Constitu- 
tion, and which shall be established by law. 
Hence,this law cannot extend to the Senators, 
because : 

(1) Their appointments are otherwise pro- 
vided for, (Art. I, §3 cl. 1.) ; and because, (2) 



dawson's foederalist. 185 



186 dawson's foederalist. 

they are already established by the Constitu- 
tion. 

2 m . The third clause cannot be understood to 
give to the President power to fill vacancies 
in the Senate, because : 

l n . This third clause is only a supplement to 
the second, which simply authorizes the 
President to make temporary appointments 
during the recess of the Senate to certain 
offices (e. g., United States Judgeships), to 
save the expense, trouble and delay of call- 
ing the Senate together every time such an 
appointment had to be made. 

2 n . The expression, " during the recess of the 
Senate," was used and not " during the re- 
cess of the State Legislature," and shows 
that the Senators were not the officers con- 
templated. 

3 n . Art. I., §3, clause 2, actually provides the 
manner of filling vacancies in the Senate. 

(1). If the vacancy happen when the State 
Legislature is not in session the Governor of 
the State having the vacancy appoints till 
the Legislature meets. 

(2). If the Legislature of the State happen 
to be in session they proceed to fill the vacancy. 

2\ The true character of the Executive. 

(1). His absolute powers. (2). His qualified 
powers. (3). The checks on the Executive. (4). 
The Executive as compared with the King of 
Great Britain. 

l j . The absolute powers of the Executive. 

1\ Unity, (p. 474). 

2\ The qualified right of veto. 

3 k . He is commander-in-chief— 

(1) Of the army of the United States ; 

(2) And of the State militia when in actual 
service. 



187 



188 dawson's foederalist. 

4 k . Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for 
Offences Against the United States. 

Except in two cases— 

(1). In cases of impeachment. 

(2). In cases of contempt of Congress. 

See Gilmore's Notes, p. 176; 7 Pet. 150; 18 
How. 307; 4 Wall. 333; 13 Wall. 128 and 
154. 

5 k . Power to make recommendations to Con- 
gress. 

6\ Power to call extra sessions of Congress 
and to adjourn both Houses when they cannot 
agree on the time of adjournment, (p. 480). 

7\ Power to Execute the Laws. 

8\ Power to receive Ambassadors. 

2 j . The Qualified Powers of the Executive. 

1\ To Make Treaties with the Advice and Con- 
sent of the Senate. 

2\ To Make Appointments to Office with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate. 

3 j . Checks on the Executive. 
1\ Liability to Impeachment. 
2\ Term of Office — only four years. 
3\ His Command of the Militia-contingent. 
4 k . No Power to Declare War or Raise Armies 

and Fleets. 
5 k . No power to adjourn Congress except in one 

case. (6\) 
4?. The Executive as compared with the King of 
Great Britain. 
l k . As to duration in office. 
(1). The President elected for four years. 
(2). The King of Great Britain is a perpetual 

and hereditary prince. 

2 k . As to Veto Power. 
(1). The President has only a qualified veto. 
(2). The King an absolute veto. 



189 



190 dawson's foederalist, 

3 k . As to Military and Naval Matters. 
(1). The President is Commander-in-Chief. 
(2). In addition, the King can declare war and 
and raise armies, (p. 485). 

4 k . As to Amenity to Punishment. 
(1). The President is Impeachable. 
(2). The King is Inviolable. 

5 k . As to Treaty-Making. 

(1). The President is associated with the Sen- 
ate. 

(2). The King is absolute. 

6\ As to Appointments to Office. 

(1). The President is associated with the Sen- 
ate. 

(2). The King is absolute, (p. 486). 

7 k . As to Granting Privileges. 
(1). The President can grant none. 
(2). The King is their fountain. 
8 k . As to Power Over Commerce and Currency. 
(1). The President can make no rules in respect 
thereto. 

(2). The Kingis in fact the arbiter of commerce 
and can regulate weights and measures. 
9 k . As to Religious Matters. 
(1). The President is no ex-officio " pillar of the 
church." 

(2). The King is head of the church. 
2 g . The Manner of the Appointment of the Execu- 
tive. 

(1). The manner of his appointment. (2). Its, 
advantages. 

l h . The Manner of Appointment of the Execu- 
tive, including the Vice-President. 
1 J . The Manner of Appointment prior to 1804. 

See Const., Art. II., §1, clause 2. 
2 j . The Manner of Appointment since 1804. 

Amendment XII was the result of the long 
and momentous struggle in the House of Repre- 
sentatives between Jefferson and Burr for the 



dawson's foederalist. 191 



192 dawson's foederaust. 

Presidency, in 1801, growing out of the defects of 
the original Article. 

2\ The Advantages of the Manner of Appoint- 
ment of the Executive. 

It was the intention of the framers of the Con- 
stitution for the people to select the electors 
merely and for the electors to select the President, 
giving them the right of an independent choice, 
unimpaired by instructions. Had the spirit of the 
Constitution been followed the following advan- 
tages would result : 
l j . The sense of the people would sufficiently op- 
erate in their choice of electors. 
2 j . The electors, being a small and select body, (1) 
would be peculiarly fitted for the purpose, and 
(2) they would act under circumstances most 
favorable to deliberation. 
3 J . It would prevent tumult and disorder. 
4\ It would prevent cabal and corruption. 

Under our present system of National nomi- 
nating conventions, the electors might be called 
on to select in case the person receiving the ma- 
jority of the electoral vote should die before the 
meeting of the electoral college; as would have 
been the case had Horace Greeley received a ma- 
jority of the electoral vote. 
3 s . The Constitutional Provisions for Securing 
Energy in the Executive. 

(1). The ingredients which constitute this energy . 
(2). The ingredients which constitute safety in the 
Republican sense. (3). The Constitutional pro- 
visions to combine safety and energy examined. 
l h . The Ingredients Which Constitute This En- 
ergy. 

(1). Unity. (2). Duration. (3). Adequate com- 
pensation. (4). Competent powers. 
2 h . Ingredients Which Constitute Energy in the 
Republican Sense. 

(1). Due dependence on the people. (2). Due re- 
sponsibility. 



dawson's foederalist. 193 



194 



3\ The Constitutional Provisions to Combine 
Safety and Energy Examined. 

l j . In Respect of Unity. 

(1). Objection to a plural Executive. (2). Ad- 
vantages of a single Executive. 

1\ Objections to a Plural Executive, (p. 492). 
I 1 . Dissensions and indecisions. 
2 1 . It conceals faults and destroys responsi- 
bility. 
3 1 . Additional Expense. 
2\ Advantages of a Single Executive. 

See 1\ 
2 j . In respect of duration of office, (p. 496). 

(1) The extent of duration in office of the Pres- 
ident; (2) the objects of duration in office; (3) 
the re-eligibility of the President. 
l k . The Extent of Duration in Office of the Pres- 
ident. 

The term of four years was finally settled on 
by the convention as best satisfying the two 
requisites of 

(1) Stability of the administration, and (2) a 
proper dependence on the Executive on the peo- 
ple. 

2 k . The objects of duration in office of the Pres- 
ident ; there are two : 

(1) To give to the President personal firmness 
in the employment of his Constitutional pow- 
ers, and (2) to give stability to his administra- 
tion. 

I 1 . To give to the President personal firmness 
in the employment of his Constitutional 
powers. 

l m . From the principle that the greater a man's 
tenure of a place, or property, the greater his 
interest in it. (p. 497). 
2 m . By its preventing an undue and servile 
pliancy of the Executive to the Congress or 
to the people, (p. 500). 



dawson's foederalist. 195 



196 dawson's foederalist. 

3 m . By its tendency to keep separate the three 

departments of Government. 
2 1 . To give stability to the Administration of 
the President, (p. 502). 
(1). Administration of Government defined. 
(2). The functions of the President. (3). The 
effect of duration on the stability of the Presi- 
dent's Administration. 

l m . Administration of Government defined. 
l n . In its largest sense. 

It comprehends all the operations of the 
body politic, whether Executive, Legislative 
or Judiciary. 
2\ In its most usual and precise sense. 

It is limited to Executive details, and falls 
peculiarly within the province of the Execu- 
tive Department. - 
2 m . The functions of the President. 
l n . The general superintendence of these mat- 
ters. 

1°. The conduct of foreign negotiations. 
2°. The preparatory plans of finance. 
3°. The application and disbursement of ap- 
propriations. 
4°. The direction of the Army and Navy. 
2 n . The appointment of the persons having 
immediate management of the above func- 
tions. 
3 m . The effect of duration in office on the sta- 
bility of the President's Administration. 
Frequent changes of men usually mean fre- 
quent changes of measures, or instability of 
Government. 
3\ The re-eligibility of the President. 

(1). Its advantages. (2). Its pretended dis- 
advantages. 

I 1 . The advantages of the re-eligibility of the 
President. 
l m . As an inducement to good behavior. 



DAWSON 's FOEDERALIST. 197 



198 dawson's foederalistv 

2 m . To prevent the temptation to sordid views, 

to peculations and to usurpations. 
3 m . To lessen the number of ex-Presidents 
" wandering among the People like discon- 
tented ghosts and sighing for a place they 
were never more to fill." (p. 505). 
[As examples of the contrary spirit : John 
Quincy Adams was a member of the House 
of Representatives, after having been Presi- 
dent, and died in Congress ; ex-President Tyler 
acted as Justice of the Peace, and ex-President 
Andrew Jackson acted as road overseer.] 
4 m . The people might avail themselves of the 
experience gained by the President in the ex- 
ercise of his office, (p. 506). 
5 m . There are particular junctures in a State 
when the continuance of one man in office is 
of the greatest moment to the public interests. 
6 m . Ineligibility would amount to a consti- 
constitutional interdiction of stability of ad- 
ministration, (p. 506). 
2 1 . The Pretended Disadvantages of Re-eligi- 
bility. 
l m . Greater Independence of the President 

This is a doubtful proposition. 
2 m . Greater Security to the People. 

It is very questionable policy to prevent the 
people from continuing in office men who have 
commended themselves to confidence. 
3 j . An adequate provision for the support of the 
President. 

(1). How secured by the Constitution. 
(2). The necessity for such declaration in the 
Constitution, (p. 509). 
l k . How secured by the Constitution. 

" The President of the United States shall re- 
ceive for his service a compensation which shall 
neither be increased nor diminished during the 
time for which he shall have been elected \ and 
he shall not receive within that period any other 



dawson's foederalisT. 199 



200 dawson's foederalist. 

emolument from the United States, or any of 
them." 

2\ The necessity for such a declaration in the 
in the Constitution. 

I 1 . It was not to be left to the Congress. 

For a control over a man's support being in 
general a control over his will, it would hare 
rendered the Executive obsequious to the Legis- 
lative Department and thus made the separa- 
tion of the three departments merely theoretical, 
(p. 509). 

2 1 . It could not be definitely fixed in the Consti- 
tution, because of the varying of circum- 
stances and in the value of money ; an amount 
that would be proper now might be entirely 
inadequate ten years hence. 

4 J . Competent Powers. 

l k . The Power of a Qualified Veto. 
(1). The objects of this power. 
(2). Its nature and reasons therefor. 

I 1 . The Objects of This Power. 

l m . To protect the Executive against the en- 
croachments of the Legislature, (p. 510). 
2 m . To guard against the enaction of bad laws. 
This assumes not that the President, or one 
man, will possess more wisdom than Congress, 
or many men, but that the oftener measures 
are examined the greater the likelihood of 
avoiding their defects. 

2 l . The Nature of This Power, and Reasons 
Therefor. 
l m . The Nature of a Qualified Veto. 

By this is meant that when a bill passes both 
Houses of Congress it must be presented to 
the President, either to sign it and thus make 
a law, or to return it to the House originating 
it, with his objections, and it shall require two- 
thirds of each House to pass a bill over his 
veto. (p. 514). 



dawson's foederaust. 201 



202 DAWSON 'S FOEDERALIST. 

2 m . Reasons for a Qualified Veto. 

An absolute veto would be less readily used: 

a man who might be afraid to defeat a law by 

his single veto, might not scruple to return it 

for reconsideration. 

2\ Power of "Commander-in-Chief of the Army 

and Navy of the United States and of the 

militia of the several States when called into 

the actual service of the United States." 

3 k . Power to require the opinion in writing "of 
the principal officer in each of the Executive 
Departments upon any subject relating to the 
duties of their respective offices" 

4\ Power " to grant reprieves and pardons for 
offences against the United States except." (p. 
517.) 

(1) In cases of impeachment. 

(2) In cases of punishments for contempts 
imposed by Congress. (7 Pet. 150 ; 4 Wall. 343 ; 
Ex- Attorney-General Garland's case, 4 Wall. 
333). 

5 k . Power "by and with the advice and con- 
sent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided 
two-thirds of the Senators present concur." 
There are five ways in which this power 
could have been delegated, contended for. (p. 
519). 
(1). To the Senate and President jointly. 
(2). To the Senate alone. 
(3). To the President alone. 
(4). By joining the House of Representatives 
in a share of the power. 

(5). In requiring two-thirds of all the Sena- 
tors. 

I 1 . The Constitution gives the power to the 
President and Senate jointly. 
l m . Treaty-making is partly a legislative and 
partly an Executive act, in that a treaty par- 
takes of the nature of a law and of a con- 
tract. 



dawson's foederalist. 203 



204 DAWSON 's FOEDERALIST. 

2 m . The Senate is associated rather than the 
House of Representatives, or both the House 
of Representatives and Senate, because of 
its superior wisdom and its greater stability. 

2 1 . It would not be best to grant this power to 
the Senate alone. 
l m . Treaty-making not being altogether a 

legislative act. 
2 m . The benefit of the Constitutional agency 
of the President would have been lost. (p. 
522). 
3\ It would not be best to grant this power to 
the President alone. 
l m . It is not wholly an Executive act. 
2 m . It would be unsafe. 
4 1 . It would not have been best to have asso- 
ciated the House of Representatives. 
See Foed., pp.448 and 523 and seq. ; ante, p. 
183. 

5 1 . The reasons for requiring two-thirds of all 
the Senators present and not two-thirds of 
all the Senators. 
See Foed., p. 143. 
6 k . The power "to nominate and, by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate, to ap- 
point ambassadors, other public ministers and 
consuls, J vdges of the Supreme Court and all 
other officers of the United States, whose ap- 
pointments are not otherwise provided for in 
the Constitution:' (p. 526). 

(1). The advantage of this plan. (2). The 
disadvantages of others. 
I 1 . The Advantages of This Plan. 
l m . In vesting the appointments solely in the 
President. 
l n . The undivided responsibility will beget 

a livelier sense of duty. 
2 n . He will have fewer personal attachments 
than a body of men. 



205 



206 dawson's foederalist. 

3 n . He will be free from that diversity of 
views and interests that distract a collec- 
tive body. (p. 528). 
4 n . Appointments to office will be more gen- 
erally the result of merit than of political 
" trades." 
2 m . In vesting the confirmation of the ap- 
pointments in the Senate. 
l n . It secures all the advantages from vesting 
the whole power solely in the President. 
Whoever may be chosen will be the choice 
of the President, and the responsibility of 
the appointment would still rest on him. 
2\ It Avoids Several Disadvantages of a Sole 
Power in the President. 
1°. They will be a powerful check on the 

favoritism of the President. 
2°. They will contribute to the stability of 
the Administration. 

The consent of the Senate would be neces- 
sary to displace as well as to appoint to 
office, (p. 532). 

[The present doctrine is that this consent 
is necessary], 
7\ The Power of Giving Information to Con- 
gress of the State of the Union. 
8\ The power of recommending measures to 

Congress. 
9 k . The power of convening both Houses or 
either of them on extraordinary occasions. 
Power to convene either House was given to 
prevent the convening of the House of Repre- 
sentatives when a treaty was to be considered. 
10\ Power to adjourn Congress when they can- 
not agree on a day. 
ll k . Power to receive ambassadors, etc. 
12\ Power to administer the laws. (p. 536). 
13 k . Power to commission all United States 
officers. 



dawson's foederalist. 207 



208 dawson's foederalist. 

3*. The Judiciary — w. c. 
(1). The necessity for a Foederal Judicature. 
(2). The manner of constituting it. 
(3). Its extent. 
I s . The Necessity for a Foederal Judicature. 

See Foed., p. 146. 
2 g . The Manner of Constituting the Judiciary. 

(1) The mode of appointing the judges; (2) 
their tenure of office; (3) the partition of the judi- 
ciary authority between different courts and their 
relations to each other. 
1\ The Mode of Appointing the Judges. 
See Foed., p. 526 and seq. ; ante p. 218 and seq. 

2\ The Tenure of Office of the Judges. 

(1) Their duration in office; (2) their compen- 
sation; (3) the precautions for their responsi- 
bility. 
l j . The Duration in Office of the Judges. 
l k . The Constitutional provision thereon. 

The judges hold their offices during good be- 
havior, though by Act of Congress a Judge who 
is seventy years of age and has served ten years 
can resign on full pay. 

2 k . The Reasons for Such Duration in Office of 
the Judges. 
1\ It conforms to the most approved of the 

then (1787) State Constitutions. 
2 1 . To secure the independence of the Judges. 
l m . The Weakness of the Judiciary. 

Their tendency is to be the weakest of the 
three departments of the Government. 
2 m . The Necessity for Independence in the 
Judges. 

l n . If the Judiciary is not strong enough to 

secure its independence of either of the other 

branches, the Union of two against one will 

result and tyranny will be unavoidable. 

2*. Because of our limited Constitution. 

Limitations on the Legislature can only be 



dawson's foederalist. 209 



210 dawson's foederalist. 

preserved through the courts with their power 
of declaring unconstitutional acts void. 

This does not imply superiority of the Ju- 
diciary over the Legislative, only the superi- 
ority of the Constitution over both. (p. 547). 

3\ In checking bad legislation. 

4\ In warding the Constitution and the 

Rights of the People against the effects of 

ill humor. 
5\ To give time to the judges to Qualify 

themselves and become familiar with the 

Laws and Precedents. 

6 n . As an inducement to fit men to accept the 
Positions. 
2 J . The Compensation of the Judges. 

(1). The constitutional provision and (2) rea- 
sons therefor. 
l k . The Constitutional Provision. 

The judges of the United States 4 ' shall at stated 
times receive for their services a compensation 
which shall not be diminished during their con- 
tinuance in office.' ' 
2 k . The Reasons Therefor. 

The fluctuation of money would not admit of 
a fixed salary in the Constitution and hence it 
was necessary to leave this to the discretion of 
Congress without the power of lessening their 
salaries. 

3 j . The Precautions for Their Responsibility. 
They are liable to impeachment. 
3\ The Partition of the Judiciary Authority be- 
tween the different courts and their relations to 
each other. 

(1) The Constitutional provision thereon; (2) 
the distribution of judicial authority between the 
Supreme Court and the inferior courts; (3) the 
jurisdiction of State courts on Foederal questions 
w. c. (p. 559). 
l j . The Constitutional Provision Thereon. 



dawson's foederalist. 211 



212 



(1) The provision stated; (2) the necessity for 
one Supreme Court as a separate and distinct 
body; (3) the necessity for inferior courts. 

1\ The Provision Stated. 

"The judicial power of the United States is to 
be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such in- 
ferior courts as the Congress may, from time to 
time, ordain and establish." 

2 k . The Necessity for One Supreme Court as a 
Separate and Distinct Body. 

I 1 . To guard against an improper intermixture 

of powers. 
2 1 . To prevent the absurdity of referring the 
revision of the decisions of permanent judges 
to those appointed for only one, two or six 
years, as in the case of Representatives and 
Senators, (p. 562). 
3\ Members of the Legislative Departments 
are not often selected for their Judicial quali- 
ties, (p. 564). 
3 k . The necessity for inferior courts. 
I 1 . As a matter of convenience. 

It will prevent the necessity of an appeal to 
the Supreme Court in every case of Foederal 
cognizance. 

2 1 . As an aid to the Supreme Court. 
3 1 . Because the State Courts would not be pro- 
per substitutes. 
l m . From their local spirit. 
2 m . From the peculiar tenure of the State 
Judges. 
2 J . The distribution of Judicial Authority between 
the Supreme Court and the inferior courts. 
1\ The Judicial Authority of the Supreme Court. 
I 1 . The original jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court. 

l m . "In cases affecting Ambassadors, other 
public ministers and consuls." 



dawson's fo federalist. 213 



214 DAWSON 'S FOEDERALIST. 

2 m . "In cases in which a State shall be a 
Party." 
2 1 . The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court. 

l m . In matters of law. (p. 568). 
This power is unquestioned. 

2 m . In matters of Fact. 

(1) The meaning of "appellate" in this con- 
nection; (2) it does not endanger trial by jury. 

l n . The meaning of "appellate" in this con- 
nection. 

It denotes the power of one tribunal to re- 
view the proceedings of another, either as to 
the law or fact, or both. (p. 569). 
2 n . This provision does not endanger Trial 
by Jury. (Foed. p. 569 and seq. See at 
length Foed. pp. 557-559.) 

This provision was adopted because : 

(1). The appellate jurisdiction will extend 
to 

(a). Cases at common law where a revision 
of the law will be necessary. 

(b). Cases under the civil law where facts 
and law are properly and usually reviewed. 

(2). Express exceptions would not do, hence 
the most practical plan was that adopted, 
subject M to such exceptions and under such 
regulations as the Congress shall make." 

(See Foed. p. 569 and seq). (p. 572). 

3 j . The jurisdiction of State Courts on Foederal 

Questions. 

The jurisdiction of State Courts will remain as 
it was except where the contrary is shown by the 
Constitution, or subsequent acts of Congress, 
(p. 572). 

As to the course of appeal. 

(1). It would certainly lie to the Supreme Court 
of the United States, (p. 574). 

(2). And probably to the subordinate Foed- 
eral Courts, (p. 575 and seq). 



dawson's foederalist. 215 



216 dawson's foederalist. 

3 g . The extent of the Judiciary Authority. 
The Judiciary authority of the Union is to extend : 

1\ To all cases in law and equity arising under 
the Constitution of the United States. 

2\ To cases of Treaties, Ambassadors, other pub" 

lie Ministers and Consuls, (p. 558). 
3 h . To cases of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdic- 
tion. 
4\ To controversies to which the United States 

shall be a party 
5\ To Controversies 
(1). Between two or more States. 
(2). Between a State and citizens of another 
State. 

(3). Between citizens of different States. 
6\ To cases between .citizens of the same State 
claiming lands under grants of different States. 
7 h . To cases between a State and the citizens 
thereof. 
6 C . Objections to the Constituton Answered. 
(1). "The Constitution has no Bill of Rights." 
(2). "The people will be too remote from the capital 
to watch their Representatives." 

(3). "There is no provision securing the debts due 
the United States;" (4) "the great expense of the 
Government." 

l d . "The Constitution has no Bill of Rights." 
l e . Several of the States, including New York, have 

no Bill of Rights, (p. 595). 
2 e . The Constitution has its Equivalent. 
l f . Limiting the Government in Cases of Impeach- 
ment. 
2 f . Preserving the Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
3 f Prohibiting Bills of Attainder and ex post facto 

Laws. 
4 f . Prohibiting Titles of Nobility. 
5 f . Preserving Jury Trial in Criminal Cases. 
6 f . Defining Treason. 



218 DAWSON'S FOEDERALIST. 

T. Limiting the Punishment of Treason. 

8 f . Guaranteeing to the States a Republican Form of 
Government. 
3*. Bills of Rights go into Particulars and Details and 

are more appropriate in State Constitutions. 
4*. Bills of Rights are often Dangerous. 

The prohibition of certain powers not granted 
might give a pretence for claiming others not prohib- 
ited. 

2 d . " The People will be too Remote from the Capital 
to Watch their Representatives." 
1*. This Argument Proves too Much. 
It would prove that there should be no general 
government. 
2 e . The people will have the usual sources of Infor- 
mation and Safety. 
l f . Through the Press. 
2 f . Through the State Governments. 
3 f . The people near the seat of the Government will 
have personal information. 
3*. "There is no provision Securing the Debts of the 
United States. 

States do not lose their rights or avoid liabilities by 
a change of Government, (p. 503 ; Grotius, B. II., 
chap, ix.) 

4 d . "The great expense of the Government. " 
l e . This is no valid objection if the proposed Gov- 
ernment be necessary, even if the objection be true. 
2 e . As a matter of fact, there will probably be fewer 
burdens in the matter of expense to the individual 
citizen than under the Articles of Confederation, 
(pp. 503, 504 and seq). 
5 a . The Analogy of the Proposed Constitution to the 
Constitution of New York. 
l b . In its Supposed Defects. 
l c . The Re-eligibility of the President. 
2 C . The Want of a Council. 
3 C . The Want of a Bill of Rights. 



dawson's foederalist. 219 



220 dawson's foederalist. 

2 b . In its real excellence. 
6 a . The Additional Security Which the Adoption of the 

Constitution Will Afford to Republican Government, to 

Liberty and Property. 

l b . Through the restraint which the preservation of the 
Union will have (1) on local factions, etc. ; (2) on for- 
eign intrigue, and (3) on military establishments. 

2 b . In the express guarantee of a Republican form of 
Government. 

3*. In the Prohibition of Titles of Nobility. 

4\ In the wise restrictions on the States. Part III. 

Part III. — Conclusion. 
l a . The Necessity for an Immediate Adoption of the 

Constitution. 

1\ No Perfect Constitution can result from Imperfect 
man. 

2 b . No Better Constitution is likely to result from an- 
other Convention. 

3\ The precarious condition of the country demands 

an early change. 
2 a . Amendments to the Constitution can best be secured 

by first adopting the Constitution. 



